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I. INTRODUCTION
The banking and financial industries in the United States and Mexico are now at
an important crossroads. The paths that are taken will have important repercussions
for years to come. In the aftermath of the massive devaluation of the peso in early
1995, Mexico's private banking industry virtually collapsed.' As reported by the
International Monetary Fund, by early 1995 the peso devaluation had led to a
dramatic increase in interest rates to levels as high as 80 percent.2 This, in turn,
made it difficult for millions of borrowers to service their debts, thereby undermining the solvency of Mexican banks The Mexican government of President Zedillo
* Revised and reprinted with permission of the American University InternationalLaw Review. An
expanded and complete version of this article was published in 14 AM. U. INT'L L REv. 6 (1999).
This article is based on a paper presented to the Seventh Annual Conference of the United States-Mexico Law
Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico on October 3, 1998, which came on the heels of the most volatile week of the
year in U.S. and global financial markets. The week saw a serious decline in global financial makets, a severe drop
in prices in U.S. stock and bond markets, and a multi-billion dollar bailout of a suddenly collapsing hedge fund.
Those events necessarily provided the context for this article.
The author thanks Franklin Gill and Claire Conrad for their support, Jayme Beaber for editorial assistance, Mark
Lovato and Momca Guardiola for research assistance, students in my fall 1998 International Business Transactions
class for providing a challenging and constructive workshop, and Fernando Montes-Negret, Barbara Creel, Irwin
Stotzky, Fred Hart. Lisa Iglesias, and Paul Smyth for support, suggestions, and encouragement. This article is
dedicated to the memory of Lynn Turgeon, a great friend and mentor through thick and thin.
**
Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
i. See Roy A. Kamoglan and Mike Lubrano, "Mexico's Banks After the December 1994 Devaluation: A
Chronology of the Government's Response," 16 N.W. J. INT'L L & BUS. 1 (1995).
2. DAVID FoKERTrs-LANDAU AND TAKATOSH ITO INTERNATIONAL CAPrTAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENT,
PROSPECTS, AND POLICY ISSUES 62-63 (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., Aug. 1995).

3. Id. (reporting debt-servicing problems of borrowers and resulting decline in asset quality in both "the
peso-denominated and foreign currency loan books of Mexican banks").
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pushed forward with a $65 billion bank bailout plan, as well as plans to permit
foreign ownership of Mexican banking.4 The continuing upheaval and bailout of
the Mexican financial sector has become something of a political lightning-rod,
highlighting the extreme schisms between economic classes in Mexico,5 particularly
between elite creditor groups and the debtor class that makes up a vast proportion
of the Mexican population. 6
In contrast to Mexico's difficulties, banking and finance in the United States has
bounced back from its earlier setbacks, such as the collapse and bailout of the
savings and loan industry, the 1987 stock market decline, and the credit crunch and

recession of the early 1990's. 7 The agenda of the U.S. banking industry is now a
multifaceted strategy of continued financial innovation, diversification and
expansion, often through merger and consolidation Some of the largest U.S. banks
have expanded by merging with or buying other commercial banks and non-bank
financial institutions.' One of the most notable examples is the announcement of
the mega-merger between Citibank and Travelers' Insurance that would create a $70
billion Citigroup.' ° This merger may spell the end of the Glass-Steagall Act's
prohibitions that have separated commercial banking from investment banking and
insurance. "
At first glance there would seem to be little relationship between banking and
finance in these two neighboring countries. In Mexico, there is financial retrenchment and a banking industry that struggles for solvency and survival.' 2 In contrast,
there is an incredible inflation in the great American bull market and the expansion

4. Mike Lubrano, "Foreign Investment in the Financial Sector of Mexico," 6 U.S.-MEx.LJ. 81 (1998)
(Mexico relaxed restrictions to attract foreign investment in its financial sector in the aftermath of the 1994-95 peso
crisis); Kenneth Bachman, Scott Benedict, Ricardo Anzaldua, "Financial Services Under the North American Free
Trade Agreement: An Overview," 28 INTL LAW. 291, 305-06 (1994).
5. Lucy Conger, "Mexicans Oppose Rescue Scheme," FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 1, 1998, at 4; Julia Preston,
"$62 Billion Bank Bailout Plan in Mexico Incites Outrage as Critics Say It Helps the Rich," N.Y. TIMES, July 31,
1998, at A6.
6. Julia Preston, "Wanted Posters in Mexico Now Feature a White Collar," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28,1998. at
A14 (formal petitions presented to Mexican Congress to begin impeachment proceedings against Guillermo Ortiz
Martinez, former Finance Minister and head of the Bank of Mexico for funding the bank bailout program with
government debt).
7. Timothy A. Canova, "The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance: From Regulated Competition
to Free-Market Receivership," 60:4 BROOKLYN L REV. 1295, 1330-36 (1995).
8. DEREGULATING FINANCIAL SERVICES: PUBLIC POLICY IN FLUX (ed., G. Kaufman and R.
Kormendi, (Ballinger Publishing Co.1986);"Trillion Dollar Banks, BusiNEss WEEK, April 27, 1998, at 32.
9. "Pretty at CitiT', ECONoMIST, April 11, 1998, at 11; "Trillion Dollar Banks," "id.,"at 32,35 (the new
Citigroup will have nearly $700 billion in assets); Michael Siconolfi, "Citicorp Merger with Travelers Signals New
Era," WAL ST.J., April 7, 1998, at Al; Rick Brooks, "NationsBank, BankAmerica Holders Vote for $43.02 Billion
Merger Plan," WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1998, at B7.
10. The sharp decline in the price of bank shares in late 1998 considerably lowered the value of the
Citibank-Travelers and the NationsBank-BankAmerica mergers. See John Authers, "Travelers, Citicorp merger
completes today," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at 21.
11. Jill Dutt & John M. Berry, "Citicorp-Travelers Deal to Test Old Regulator View," WASH. POST, April
7, 1998, Cl; J. Robert Brown, Jr., "The Great Fall: The Consequences of Repealing the Glass-Steagall Act," 2
STAN. J.L Bus. & FIN. 129 (1995); WOUJFGANO H. RiNcK, "CONSOUDATiON OF FEDERAL BANK REGULATION?",
REFORMING MONEY AND FINANCE 185-86 (R. Guttmann ed., M.E. Sharpe 1997).
12. Javier Gavito, Aaron Silva, Guillermo Zamarripa, "Mexico's Banking Crisis: Origins, Consequences,
and Countermeasures," chapter in REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NAFTA

COUNTRIES AND BEYOND 228-45 (G.M. von Furstenberg, ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997);"Bancomer of
Mexico Braces Itself as It Heads Into Rough Waters," W.L ST. J., Oct. 2, 1998, at A10.
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of U.S. banking and finance into new geographic and product areas. 13 But Mexico
began the process of opening its banks to foreign ownership at the precise time that
the agenda of U.S. banks was to branch out into more diverse types of banking and
to continue investing in emerging economies.' 4 These trends, therefore, indicate the
possibility of a "marriage of convenience,"'" with American commercial and
6
investment banking coming to the rescue of the flailing Mexican banking industry.
Hoping to preside over this marriage is a host of ministers that seek to broaden the
agenda of a particular type of neoliberal globalization, one marked by increased
deregulation, financial liberalization, and privatization.' 7
Such a marriage between U.S. and Mexican banking and finance would of course
create significant legal opportunities. Much has been written about the legal details
of Mexico's bank bailout and privatization plans,'" as well as the legal issues
involved in the consolidation of U.S. banking and the erosion of the Glass-Steagall
Act, 9 and the minutia of the variety of private capital market developments and
investment opportunities on both sides of the border.'
It is important to step back from the trees and to consider the forest, to step back
from the details, and to consider the broader legal and extra-legal developments that
often provide the unspoken context for much private financial activity. This would
permit an examination of our most fundamental assumptions about the nature of
today's globalization of money and finance. This article will consider the context
of the global currency contagion, which may threaten the profitability of private
financial institutions,2' the prospects for a marriage between U.S. and Mexican
banking, and the economic progress upon which so much of the work of U.S.Mexican cooperation depends.22
13. See notes 8-11, infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 4, 8-9. infra.
15. Sidney Weintraub, A Mariage of Convenience: Relations Between Mexico and the United States
(1990)(likening the relations more as a "mixed marriage" of different cultures). See Stephen Zamora, "The
Americanization of Mexican Law: Non-Trade Issues in the North American Free Trade Agreement," 24 LAw &
POL'Y INT'L BUS. 391, 438 (1993).
16. See John E. Rogers & Adrian Zubikarai Arriola, "Foreign Banks in Mexico: on the Verge of a New
Era?"7-12 PROGRAM OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, U.S.-MEICO LAW INSTrrfrE (1998).
17. Beyond Bretton Woods: Alternatives to the Global Economic Order (J. Cavanagh et al. eds., Institute
for Policy Studies 1994); FIFY YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST THE WORLD BANK AND THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (K. Danaher & M. Yunus eds.,South End Press 1994); CHERYL PAYER, THE
DEBT TRAP: THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND THE THIRD WORLD(1974).
18. Rogers & Arriola, supra note 15.
and Kenneth A. Guenther, "The Erosion of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank
19. See Robert Rowe mI
Holding Company Act," 115 BANKING LJ. 663 (1998); Note, "The New American Universal Bank." 110 HARV.
L REV. 1310 (1997); "Project: Regulatory Reform: A Survey of the Impact of Regulation and Deregulation on
Selected Industries. Regulatory Reform in Transition: The Dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act," 47 ADMIN.
L.REv. 545 (1995); George Benston, The Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking (1990).
20. Ralph Folsom & W. Davis Folsom, Understanding NAFrA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
IMPLICATIONS(1997); SCOr & WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 768-812 (1997).
21. Joseph Kahn, "Merril Cites $1.4 Billion Exposure to Long-Tenn," N.Y.TIMES, Oct., 1998, at Cl; Tracy
Corrigan, Clay Harris, "Merrill to Cut 3,400 Jobs After Sharp Fall in Profits," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 14, 1998,
at 1; Edmund L. Andrews, "Market Place: UBS says it will reduce international lending, as well as risks like
investment in distressed loans," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at C12; John Authers, "BankAmerica in $1.4 Billion
Provision," FINANCIAL'IMES, Oct. 15. 1998, at 1.
22. The fallout from the Asian contagion has already cost the local economy of New Mexico thousands of
jobs. See Sue Major Holmes. "Asian Woes Dragged Down N.M.," ALBUQUERQUE J., Dec. 29, 1998, at C3; See
also, Rob Valletta,"East Asia's Impact on Twelfth District Exports,"Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,
Economic Letter No 98-35 (Nov. 20. 1998) (slowdown in U.S. manufacturing stemming from Asian recession);
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The currency contagion continues to bring tremendous dislocations and hardship
to Mexican society.' For instance, very high real interest rates and cutbacks in the
government's fiscal programs have harmed a wide segment of the Mexican
population.' Recent financial market developments have also brought fears that
Wall Street's bull market could itself be threatened by the widening global financial
turmoil.2 5 Instead of congratulating ourselves over the opportunity to exploit this
crisis environment, we should focus on the potential benefits of a more stable
financial regime, one that could create opportunities for private profit while also
providing the foundation for renewed prosperity for a wider population than merely
the supplicants of high finance.
II. THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL CONTAGION
A.

Recent Stresses: Banks, Hedge Funds and Derivatives
The global currency contagion has also offered a shock to the conventional
wisdom by striking at U.S.-based financial institutions with so little warning.2 6 The
sudden meltdown and bailout in October 1998 of a large U.S.-based hedge fund
called Long-Term Capital Management, L.P.2" has shown the very large exposure
of American banks from lending many millions of dollars to Long-Term Capital, as
well as to hundreds of other hedge funds for highly speculative investments in
exotic financial instruments known as derivatives.2" Regulators are increasingly
concerned that the largest U.S. banks have significant credit exposure to derivative
trading, particularly to exchange rate contracts, 9 and that the Basle Accord's riskbased capital requirements fail to accurately reflect the risks involved in such
derivative trading."°

"Treasury Study Shows Effects of Global Financial Situation," Treasury News, Oct.6, 1998
<http:I/www.treas.gov/press/releases/pr2739.html>.
23. Anthony DePalma, "In Mexico, Hunger for Poor And Middle-Class Hardship," N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 15,
1995, at 1; Allan H. Meltzer, "Clinton's Bailout Was No Favor to Mexicans," WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1996, at Al 1.
Julia Preston, "Mexicans Rise in a Rate Rebellion," lNT'LHERA Tmm., April 8, 1996, at 10 (variable interest rates
rose above 100 percent; nearly 20 percent of value of all loans were past due).
24. See WijAm GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR Nor 263, 267(1997) (interest rates on ordinary
Mexicans in the hundreds of percent illustrate that developing countries like Mexico "make a kind of deal with the
devil when they open themselves to the animal spirits of global capital").
25. Paul Beckett, "Banks Latin Exposure Moves to Fore," WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 1998, at A3; Robert D.
Hershey Jr., "The Sell-off in Stocks Deepen as Markets Plunge Worldwide," N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at Cl.
26. The past Summit meetings of the Group of Seven (G-7) leading industrial countries now seem like
annual rituals of complacency, where western leaders failed to address the root causes of contagion, and focused
instead on crisis-management See "From Halifax to Lyons: What Has Been Done About Crisis Management?" No.
200, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (1996).
27. Many hedge funds, like Long-Term Capital Management, are structured as limited partnerships, and
are open only to "sophisticated investors" who must have a net worth of more than $1 million and an annual
income of more than $200,000 in each of the most recent two years. See Sharon R. King, "After Hedge Fund
Bailout, Tighter Restrictions Are Seen," N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 1998, at C5.
28. Robert D. Hershey Jr., "A Warning To Banks: Scrutinize Hedge Funds," N.Y. TUMES. Dec. 17, 1998,
at C4; Daniel P. Cunningham, et. al., "An Introduction to OTC Derivatives," 848 PL/Corp 121 (1994).
29. Stephen Zamora, "Regulating the Global Banking Network: What Role (If Any) For the IMF?," 62
FoaDAM L REv. 1953, 1956-57 (1994) ("by 1992, the aggregate credit exposure of ten U.S. banks due to
derivative trading had reached $170 billion, or 17.3% of their total assets").
30. See George Graham, "Warning on poor lending standards," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at 8;
David Barboza & Jeff Gerth, "On Regulating Derivatives," N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 15, 1998, at Cl; Barbara C.
Matthews, "Capital Adequacy, Netting, and Derivatives," 2 STAN. J.L Bus. & FIN. 167 (1995); Bruce S. Darringer,
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Although regulators and legal commentators recognize the role of hedge funds
and derivative trading in transmitting financial failure across markets, 3' discussion
of such dynamics are often confined to experts and technocrats. Consequently, the
failures of private financial actors do not receive much blame when financial
contagion strikes.32 Instead, the focus is on the victim countries, their supposed
failures, and on policies that place the burdens of adjustment on those victim
countries.33
The drama surrounding Long-Term Capital Management's mismanagement has
exposed a need for greater humility. For instance, in the past several years the
United States has been preaching to the rest of the world the dangers of crony
capitalism, the dangers of not moving fast enough to close down insolvent banks,
and the need for transparency.' And then suddenly there was this flagrant wake up
call, a reminder that the U.S. is not immune to such folly and crass self-interest.3 5
There are several challenging and frightening aspects of the recent turmoil in
financial markets. First is the unpredictability of the onset of financial panic in any
particular market. Little more than an unsubstantiated rumor, a disappointing report
about earnings or foreign reserves, or even a bearish editorial, triggers a sudden turn
in herd mentality to panic selling.' Second is the manner in which financial failure
in one market is so quickly transmitted around the globe into selling in other
financial markets, justly earning the description of "contagion." '3 "
There are many damning facts that should not be forgotten once a sense of calm
replaces the panic of the fall of 1998: the fact that Long-Term Capital Management,
a hedge fund with about $2.3 billion in capitalization, could leverage hundreds of
billions of dollars in loans from some of the world's largest private financial
institutions, thereby increasing its own exposure to one of systematic proportions;" S
the fact that this hedge fund was directed by Myron Scholes and Robert Merton,

"Swaps, Banks, and Capital: An Analysis of Swap Risks and a Critical Assessment of the Basle Accord's
Treatment of Swaps," 16 U. PA. INT'L Bus. L 259 (1995).
31.

Charles A. Samuelson, Note, "The Fall of Barings: Lessons for Legal Oversight of Derivatives

Transactions in the United States," 29 CORNELL INT'L LJ.767 (1996); J.Christopher Kojima, "Product-Based
Solutions to Financial Innovation: The Promise and Danger of Applying Federal Securities Laws to OTC
Derivatives," 33 AM. Bus. LJ.259 (1995); Nancy Worth. "Harnonizing Capital Adequacy Rules for International
Banks and Securities Firms," 18 N.CJ. INT'L L & COM. REG. 133 (1992).
32. In fact derivatives are often characterized as a solution, rather than a problem, for the investment needs
of emerlig markets. Ovidio E Diaz Espino, "merging Markets Derivatives Set To Expand," 1017 PU/CORr 669
(1997).
33. Jeffrey D. Sachs, "The Wrong Medicine for Asia," N.Y. TIMES. Nov. 3, 1998, at A19. ("the currency
crisis is not the result of Asian government profligacy. This is a crisis made mainly in the private, albeit under-

regulated, financial markets.")
34. For a description of the deregulationist program and assumptions, see BRUCE COGGINS, DOES
FINANCiA. DEREGULATION WORK? A CRmrQUE OF FREE MARKEr APPROACHES 11-30 (1998).

35. Richard Stevenson, "Fiscal Stones. Glass Houses: Bailout Points Finger Back Toward the U.S.," N.Y.
TIMs. Sept. 26, 1998. at A].

36. For instance, the market tamed increasingly against the Russian ruble upon publication of a letter in
the Financial Times by speculator George Soros predicting the ruble's devaluation; "Soros Urges Russia to Devalue
Ruble." FINANCIAL TIMs. Aug. 13, 1998. at 1;"Russian to the Exits:'A Global Margin Call' Rocks Markets,
Banks, and Borris Yeltsin" WALL STJ., August 28, 1998, at Al.

37. Hedge funds burned in Russia's meltdown needed to cover open positions by selling U.S. Treasuries
and corporate debt, thereby putting downward pressure on those markets, and undermining the positions of other
hedge funds. See Gretchen Morgenson, "Hedge Fund Bailout Rattles Investors and Markets" N.Y. TIMES. sept.
25, 1998. at Al. C4.
38. Floyd Norris. "Risking Everything on One Big Gambler," N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 1. 1998. at A30.
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two Nobel laureates in economics who until recently were hailed as financial
geniuses;39 and the fact that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, rather than
permit the meltdown of an obviously insolvent Long-Term Capital Management
hedge fund and risk widening the financial crisis, used its offices to broker a $3.65
billion bailout of that hedge fund. 4
These events suggest the United States is not immune from these evils and
weaknesses that we deplore in others, including a frightening lack of financial
transparency, 4 hesitation in closing down insolvent financial institutions when to
do so risks wider financial and economic carnage, and the so-called "crony
capitalism" tendency of ostensibly public-sector regulatory authorities to reach out
to help their friends in the private sector.42 The revelation that among Long-Term
Capital Management's partners was David W. Mullins Jr., a former vice chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board, is particularly embarrassing.43 But the class-biased
cronyism of the Federal Reserve goes much further.' In mid-October 1998, the
Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee convened a special emergency meeting,
by conference call, to lower short-term interest rates.45 This was motivated in no
small part by a desire to assist not just Long-Term Capital Management, but other
hedge funds as well to unwind their exposed positions in the government and
private sector bond markets.4 s
Long-Term Capital Management should be seen as a glaring reminder that no
country, not even the U.S. economic powerhouse, is immune from the financial
contagion, from global market downtrends, or from the human proclivity to hide the
truth and help one's cronies. It also suggests the need for greater humility when our
so-called experts at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the U.S. Treasury
Department dispense advice and dictates to others, often as conditions for badly
needed financial assistance.47

39. See Peter Tnsell, "An Alchemist Who Turned Gold Into Lead," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998. at Cl, C5;

Jon Krainer, "The 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics."Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco Letter, No. 98-05 (Feb.
13. 1998); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH: 1929 58-61, 120, 129-30, (1954)(warning that

financial genius is always before the fall).
40. See Gretchen Morgenson, "Seeing a Fund as Too Big to Fail, New York Fed Assists Its Bailout," N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at Al; Richard W. Stevenson. "Fed Chief Defends U.S. Role in Saving Giant Hedge Fund,"
N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 2, 1998, at AI; Truel, supra note 39, at CI, C5.
41. See also Melody Petersen, "Trick: Accounting Draws Levitt Criticism," N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 29, 1998,
at C8 (Arthur Levitt, chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission harshly criticized the use of
"accounting hocus-pocus" to manipulate earnings numbers reported to shareholders); Melody Petersen, "U.N.
Report Faults Big Accountants in Asia Crisis," N.Y. TIMES, Oct, 24, 1998, at BI.
42. John Plender, "Western crony capitalism," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 314, 1998, at 6.
43. Stevenson, supra note 40; Truell, supra note 39.

44. Canova, supra note 7, at 1335 (Federal Reserve provided large interest rate spread as a hidden subsidy
to bailout commercial banks).
45. Richard W. Stevenson, "Fed Was Worried About Misinterpretation," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1998. at C5
(no formal vote was taken of members of the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee; the interest rate cut was

made under Chairman Greenspan's authority). Minutes of the Fed's October 15th meeting stated that lowering
interest rates would Amore likely help to settle volatile financial markets and cushion the effects of more restrictive
financial conditions.
46. Bill Barnhart, "Fed Steps In, Stocks Take Off While Many Applaud, Cut is for the Few," CHICAGO
TRIBUNE, Oct.16,1998, at l("the Fed hopes to stimulate enough bidders for risky assets to enable hedge funds and
other highly leveraged speculators to sell their positions with the least shock waves possible"); Richard W.
Stevenson, "Federal Reserve Cuts Rates Again; Wall St. Surges," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1998, at Al, C5.
47. See Mark Landler, "U.S. Hedge Fund Bailout Raises Asian Eyebrows," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998,
at C8; Nicholas D. Kristof, "Japan Sees Itself as Scapegoat Of Washington in Asia Crisis," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21,
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For those who remain unconvinced of such lessons, pecuniary concerns
stemming from the meltdown and bailout of Long-Term Capital Management may
prove more persuasive. The losses incurred by some of our leading private
commercial and investment banks, incurred because of their reckless lending to this
hedge fund, could hamper their willingness and ability to increase or even maintain
their present levels of investment in emerging market economies, including the
Mexican banking and financial sector.4' Long-Term Capital mismanagement, and
the specter of other financial losses from banking and hedge fund exposure in
derivative markets, could threaten consummation of the marriage of U.S. investors
to the rescue of Mexican banking and finance.
B. Originsof Contagion: CapitalAccount Liberalizationand the "Hot Money"
Problem
The currency contagion has once again brought economic trouble to Mexico. For
instance, in the aftermath of the Russian meltdown, the Mexican peso declined by
almost 20 percent in value as capital fled from most emerging markets.49 Mexico
raised interest rates above 40 percent to appease the international currency
markets.' These high interest rates, when combined with plunging oil revenues and
falling domestic demand, 5 will increase the likelihood of future trade and budget
deficits, and continuing dependence on foreign capital.
Mexico's recent difficulties should not come as too much of a surprise. The very
origins of today's currency contagion can be traced to the 1994-1995 contagion of
panic against the Mexican peso. By 1994, Mexico had come to rely heavily on
short-term portfolio capital inflows, also referred to as "hot money." Foreigners
were buying about 40% of Mexican treasury notes and held securities accounting
for 30% of Mexico's stock market capitalization.52 Foreign portfolio investment in
Mexico skyrocketed from an annual average of about $5 billion for the period from
1986 to 1990 to $67 billion in 1993 . 3 Between 1989 and 1993, Latin America
captured nearly 60% of the short-term portfolio investment flows into emerging
markets, and the Mexican stock market rose by nearly 500% in dollar terms during
that period.' But, as the peso crisis demonstrated, if a country does not protect
itself against these short-term hot money inflows, it may become susceptible to a
panic, an outflow. After all, what is an outflow problem? It is when everyone starts
heading to the door simply because everyone else is heading to the door.55 There is
not necessarily a rational reason behind the panic. We must conclude that Mexico
and other emerging market economies had become addicted to short-term capital
1998, at Al.
48. See note 24 infra.
49. Sam Dillon, "Mexican Prices Feel the Squeeze of World Economic Trouble," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15,
1998, at C4.
50. Id.
51. 11 Paul Solman & Robert Corzine, "Commodity Exporters Hit by Slump in World Prices," FINANCIAL
TIMES, Dec.11. 1998, at 21.
52. Enrique R. Carrasco and Randall Thomas, "Encouraging Relational Investment and Controlling
Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial Crisis," 34 COLUMBIA
J.TRANS.L 539, 572-73 (1996).
53. Id. at 557.
54. id. at 557,560.
55. Walter Russell Mead, "Rule 1: Don't Panic. Rule 2: Panic First," 130 ESQUIRE 92 (Oct.1998).
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inflows and consequently were very vulnerable when those inflows turned suddenly
to outflows as a result of changes in mass market psychology.56
Il.

NAFrA'S MASK OFNEOLIBERAL DISCOURSES

In the aftermath of the 1995 peso collapse, there has been an ongoing debate
concerning the relative merits of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the $51 billion international bailout package for Mexico.5 7 The U.S.
and Mexican governments prefer to characterize both as great success stories.
Mexico has repaid the emergency bailout loans with interest,58 and some studies
suggest that since NAFTA there has been a surge in foreign direct investment from
the U.S. to Mexico, resulting in an increase of some 600,000 jobs in Mexico.59 We
should, however, consider a wider range of criteria when assessing the results of the
NAFTA regime of free capital mobility and the peso collapse and bailout. For
instance, a more convincing narrative holds that NAFTA's liberalization of capital
flows and the subsequent peso crash and economic austerity have contributed to
steep declines in jobs and real incomes for millions of Mexicans," as well as to the
recent upsurge in illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S. 6
While NAFTA may have contributed to export and job creation in the
maquiladoras at the border, NAFTA also required that Mexico substantially
liberalize its capital account (i.e., remove restrictions on the inflow and outflow of
foreign capital). 62 NAFTA Article 1109 requires that each country "permit all
transfers relating to an investment." 63 Contrary to the focus of some
commentators,6' NAFTA's capital liberalization provisions are not confined to

56. Ricardo French-Davis, "Policy Implications of the Tequila Effect," 41 CHALLENGE 15-43 (1998).

57. Russell Dean Covey, Note, "Adventures in the Zone of Twilight: Separation of Powers and National
Economic Security in the Mexican Bailout," 105 YALE L J. 1311 (1996). The bailout consisted of contributions

from the IMF ($18 billion), the Bank for International Settlements ($10 billion), foreign commercial banks ($3
billion), and the U.S. Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund ($20 billion). Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 52,
at 568. Mexico also agreed to put the proceeds from its oil sales through an escrow account with the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York as collateral for the U.S. loan. See SIDNEY WEiErRAUD, NAFTA AT THREE 63 (1997).

58. David Hale, "Such a Deal: The Much-Maligned Mexico Bailout is Looking Smart, and Not Just for
Mexico." WASH. POST, June 2, 1996, at C4.
59. Eusebio Francisco Flores Banaza, "Foreign Exchange Challenges vis-a-vis NAFTA. five years after
NAFTA came into force." Presentation to U.S.-Mcxico Judicial Exchange Border Conference (March 19, 1999).
See also Paul Krugman. "The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA." 75:5 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 13 (1993) (Krugman
did not foresee the substantial depressing effects on Mexican jobs and real income prior to the peso collapse and
ensuing economic austerity).
60. Folkerts-Landau, et al, supra note 2, at 125-27; Weintraub, supranote 57, at 54-68 (acknowledging that
NAFFA liberalized capital inflows, yet disclaiming NAFTA responsibility for adverse consequences that followed);
Folsom & Folsom, supra note 20. at 307-08.
61. David E. Sanger, "Mexico Crisis Seen Spurring Flow of Aliens," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1995, at A3;
ROBERT APONTE, "The Effects of NAFTA on Mexico-United States Immigration," chapter in POLICY CHOICES:
FREE TRADE AMONG NAFTA NATIONS 195-216 (Karen Robert & Mark I Wilson, eds., Michigan State University
Press 1996) (discussing the jobs and immigration debates); SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LBOR AND CAPITAL
120(1988).
62. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America, the
Government of Canada and the Government of the United Mexican States, 32 LLM. 1480 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA], Chapters II and 14.
63. 1I at Article 1109 (payment of the investment, profits, dividends, interest, capital gains and other fees;
such transfers to be made in a freely usable currency at the market rate of exchange).
64. SeeGloria L Sandrino, "The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico:
A Third World Perspective," 27 VAND.J.TRANSNAT'L L 259 (1994); Jose E. Alvarez, "Critical Theory and the
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foreign direct investment (FDI), which usually refers to a foreign investment in
fixed plant and equipment. 65 Rather, the NAFTA liberalization provisions also
apply to many types of so-called "hot money" investments, such as foreign portfolio
investment in stocks and bonds. 66 This process of financial liberalization left
Mexico highly dependent on such hot money inflows.67
Finally, Chapter 14 of NAFTA provides for a gradual liberalization of foreign
ownership of financial institutions and services." The overall result of these
NAFTA provisions has been a significant increase in the operation of foreign
financial institutions in Mexico,69 including the dramatic surge of hot money
inflows as Mexico became overly dependent on70 short-term portfolio capital
investment to finance its trade and budget deficits.
NAFTA's capital liberalization provisions, the centerpiece of the Mexican
7
government's neoliberal agenda, led directly to the eventual run on the peso. '
Capital account liberalization set the stage and provided the mechanism for such
capital flight.' As a consequence of the peso collapse, Mexico was forced to adopt
stringent economic austerity measures as a condition for IMF financial assistance."
These measures include fiscal and monetary austerity, which have translated into

North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven," 28 U. MIAM INTER-AM.LREV. 303 (1996-97);
Guillermo Emiliano Del Toro, "Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico and the 1994 Crisis: A Legal Perspective,"
20 Hous. I. INT'L L. 1 (1997). These authors either were unaware of the distinction between foreign direct
investment (FDI) and portfolio capital, intended for the term FDI to include portfolio capital flows, or were writing
before the significance of such hot money flows were apparent
65. See PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS 232,

235 (1997) (foreign direct investment is usually by multinational corporations involving purchase of physical assets
in another country; portfolio investment involves purchase of financial instruments such as common stocks or
bonds).
66. NAFTA's definition of investment includes equity securities, interests in an enterprise that entitles
owner to share of income or profits, loans to affiliates, and debt securities where the original maturity is at least
three years. NAFTA, supra. note 62. at Art. 1139. Even financial instruments that are not considered short-term
(such as equities or debt securities with long maturities) can be sold instantly, and are therefore vulnerable to shifts
in market sentiment. See "Bank for International Settlements: 68th Annual Report" (Bank for International
Settlements, Basle), June 1998, at 129.
67. While not expressly required by NAFTA, the Mexican government came to rely on capital inflows in
the form of foreign investment in tesobonos (short-term government debt). Weintraub, supra note 57. at 55. But
this step was necessary to finance deficits that were made inevitable by NAFTA liberalization of trade in capital
goods. Folsom & Folsom, supra note 20. at 299.
68, NAFTA, supra note 62 at Chapter 14 (provides for rights of establishment of financial institutions,
most-favored-nation and national treatment). Annex VII(B) of Chapter 14 set forth Mexico's reservations,
commitments, and time-tables with respect to establishment and operation of foreign-owned financial institutions
in Mexico.
69. Rogers & Arriola, supra note 15, at 6 (Mexico amended its Credit Institutions Law to give effect to
Annex VII(B); by mid-1998 at least 17 subsidiaries of foreign banks were operating in Mexico).
70. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 2, at 53-55. The restructuring of Mexico's debt from bank loans to "Brady
bonds" may also have contributed to the peso crisis of 1995 by increasing the short-term nature of its exposure.
Id at 64 (on thesteep fall in Mexican Brady bonds in the frst quater of 1995). For details of the Brady bond, see
FOLSOM, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 947-48 (1995).

71. Even prior to NAFTA's liberalization of capital flows, the Mexican government had started the process
by lifting restrictions on inflows in April 1992 and outflows in November 1991. 1990 was the first year of Mexico's
surge in inflows and outflows. See Folkerts-Landau, etal, supra note 2, at 101-102.
72. See notes 52-56, 63-70 infra and accompanying text.
73. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 52, at 565-71. Letter of Intent from Guillermo Ortiz Martinez,
Secretary of Finance and Public Credit of Mexico, and Miguel Manwcra Aguayo, Governor of the Bank of Mexico,
to Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, Jan. 26, 1995 (English translation
on file with author).
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extremely high real interest rates.74 When combined with the steep drop in the value
of the peso in early 1995, the result has been an escalation in inflation and interest
rates and a steep decline in living standards for millions of Mexicans. 75 The free
market model has probably resulted in the loss of far more jobs within the interior
of Mexico than have been gained in the bustling maquiladoras along the border.76
Yet the dominant narratives about NAFTA focus exclusively on maquiladora job
gains, to the exclusion of the greater general economic austerity job losses. 7
While the relationship between NAFTA's capital liberalization and Mexico's
subsequent economic austerity is widely recognized by policy-makers and analysts,
this reality is largely masked by other more dominant discourses that explain
Mexico's economic and financial problems in terms that serve elite financial
interests. These dominant discourses about development and neoliberal economic
reform have "blamed the victim" and promoted U.S. free market cultural values
while masking the very real political and structural limitations in transplanting U.S.
legal institutions to Mexico and other developing countries.7" For instance, there are
consistent assertions that Mexico's secured transactions and bankruptcy laws are
not just deficient, but pre-modem, archaic, and backwards. 79 These same voices
contend that Mexico's economic development will remain retarded as long as the
Mexican government fails to adopt protections of creditors modeled after the U.S.
Uniform Commercial Code.8"
These discourses are propagated by elite corporate groups within the U.S. 8 that
have vested interests in altering particular aspects of Mexico's legal system 2 while

74. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 2, at 63; Weintraub, supra note 57, at 65. Even after the peso collapse.
the Mexican government decided to permit futures trading of the peso on the Chicago Board of Trade.
Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the Mexican
Comisidn Nacional Bancaria y de Valores, May 11, 1995 <<http:\\www.cftc.gov/opabackgrounder/mou.html>>.
75. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 52, at 569-71.
76. WORLD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY 1997: TRENDS AND POLICIES IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 34-35 (United Nations, New York. 1997); WORLD EMPLOYMENT REPORT 1998-99
(International Labour Organization, Geneva. 1998); YEARBOOK OF LABOUR STATISTICS 1998 (International
Labour Organization, Geneva. 1998); JAIME SUCIIUCKI, MExICO: FROM MONTEzuMA TO NAFrA, CHIAPAS, AND
BEYOND 167, 194 (1996).
77. See notes 59, 78-80 infra and accompanying text.
78. Elizabeth M. Iglesias, "Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locating Latinas/os in the
Linkage Debates," 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L REV. 361, 377-85 (1996-97).
79. See Boris Kozolchyk, "What To Do About Mexico's Antiquated Secured Financing Law," (National
Law Center for Inter American Free Trade, 1998); Alejandro Gairo, "Security Interests in Personal Property in Latin
America: A Comparison With Article 9 and a Model For Reform," 9 HOUJ.INT'L L 157 (1987); Mike Lubrano,
"Practical Difficulties in Mexican Workouts and Bankruptcy," NORTH AMERICAN CORPORATE LAWYER, Vol. Il
(1996); Franklin Gill, Remarks to the Commerce and Trade Workshop of the U.S. Mexico Judicial Exchange
Border Conference (March 19-20. 1999).
80. Boris Kozolchyk, "The Basis for Proposed Legislation to Modernize Secured Financing in Mexico,"
5 U.S.-MEX.LJ. 43, 52 (1997); John E. Rogers & Carlos de la Craza-Santos, "General Goods: A Case Involving
Security Interests in Inventory and Accounts in the United States, Canada and Mexico," 5 U.S.-MEx.LJ. 3
(1997);John M. Wilson-Molina, "Mexico's Current Secured Financing System: The Law, the Registries and the
Need for Reform," National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 1997.
81. For instance, the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade is well-funded by elite U.S.
banking, finance, and corporate contributions. At the top of its agenda is reform of Mexico's secured financing and
bankruptcy laws. See <http/www.natlaw.com> for information about membership, corporate backing, and its
secured financing and other projects. Noticeably absent from its agenda are any proposals to address Mexico's
vulnerability to the hot money problem and its continuing economic austerity.
82. Much of the agenda of those propagating the dominant development narratives is to provide additional
protections to creditors. See notes 79-81 infra and accompanying text.
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maintaining other aspects that have certainly done far more damage to Mexico's
economic development. 3
A very ethnocentric mind-set permeates these dominant discourses. They
conveniently overlook the flaws in the U.S. legal system 4 and in U.S. bankruptcy
law.85 In addition, there seems to be no formal modeling or empirical support for the
more dramatic assertions that Mexico's commercial code is the primary and direct
cause of the country's economic plight. Finally, these dominant development
discourses also overstate the deficiencies in Mexican law. Contrary to the thrust of
the dominant narratives, Mexican law provides significant protection of creditors,
including provisions for speedy attachment of assets. 6 Recent Mexican Supreme
Court decisions undermine debtors' defenses and claims that sharply escalating
interest rates are unconscionable and constitute usury or excessive enrichment of
creditors.8 7
While there are differences between Mexico's civil law system and the U.S.
common law system, there are also significant similarities between U.S. and
Mexican commercial law. 8 But the dominant development discourses continue to
ignore both the many deficiencies in the U.S. legal system and the fact that Mexican
law provides significant protection for creditors. 9
It is particularly distorting to assert with such condescending authority that
Mexico's well-developed commercial law impedes economic development' at a
time when the neoliberal model has saddled the Mexican population with crippling
interest rates that are as high as one hundred or more percent.9 In the context of
such financial conditions, even the most comprehensive legal protections for
creditors will not suffice. One cannot draw blood from a stone; and creditors cannot
easily stay solvent by trying to collect on debts and attach assets in an economic

83. Among the most ignored of these dynamics has been those relating to capital account liberalization.
See notes 169-183, 187-189 infra and accompanying text.
84. See George A. Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, "Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for
Profit," BROOKNGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrvrrY 2 (Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C.1993); Floyd Norris,
"The Rise of Phony Corporate Tax Shelters," N.Y. TRAEs, Feb. 8. 1999, at A26.
85. See Douglas G. Baird, "Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren," 54
U.Cit.LREv. 815 (1987); Morris G. Shanker, "The Abuse and Use of Federal Bankruptcy Power," 26 CASE W.
RES. L REV. 3 (1976); Saul Hansell, 'Battle Emerging On How To Revise Bankruptcy Law," N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
19, 1997, at 1; Katharine Q. Seelye, "Senate Votes to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse." N.Y. TbES, Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
86. lic. Guadalupe Von Ontiveros, Lic. Raquel Nieblas German, and Lic. Martin Antonio Logo Romero,
Remarks to the Commerce and Trade Workshop of the U.S.-Mexico Judicial Exchange Border Conference (March
19-20, 1999) (all three are Mexican state court judges).
87. Id See also Julia Preston, "Mexico Gets Green light to Charge Interest on Interest," N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 1998, at C2.
88. Id. Likewise, the advent of limited liability in the U.S. was once criticized as inefficient because it
transferred business risks to creditors. See Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock, Stuart Tumbull, "An Economic
Analysis of Limited Liability Corporation Law," 30 U. TORONTO L J. 117 (1980). More recent scholars claim the
opposite, that limited liability is a necessary precondition to capital accumulation. But the empirical evidence on
such a fundamental question as the relationship of corporation law and economic growth is inconclusive. See
Phillip 1.Blumberg, "Limited Liability and Corporate Groups," Il J. CORP. L 573 (1986).
89. For such reasons, combined with the overriding private profit objectives of their proponents, some of
these dominant discourses are neocolonial in nature and resemble a type of legal imperialism.
90. A study by the American Law Institute was generally positive in its assessment of Mexican bankruptcy
law. See also International Statement of Mexican Bankruptcy Law, Tentative Draft (April 15, 1998), Transnational
Insolvency Project of the American Law Institute.
91. Greider, supra note 22, at 267.
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environment in which jobs are disappearing and real incomes are falling, no matter
what the legal protections."
Most importantly, the dominant discourses that criticize Mexican commercial
culture also serve to crowd out other perspectives that are more critical of the U.S.
neoliberal model.93 The dominant narratives mask and distort more comprehensive
descriptions of reality, including narratives that link capital account liberalization
to the hot money problem and currency contagion. 4 Critical perspectives are often
marginalized as unrealistic, and dismissed because of the attenuated chain of
causation of their analyses: 95 i.e., liberalized capital flows contribute to an
overvalued peso, which leads to growing trade deficits; this, in turn, leads to an
eventual sudden outflow of capital and downward pressure on the peso; as a result,
the Bank of Mexico engages in foreign exchange market interventions and raises
interest rates to prop up the peso. Finally, the sharply higher interest rates translate
into massive job losses, declining incomes, rising bankruptcies and financial
failures. 96 Such a sophisticated analysis is empirically verifiable. But, the attenuated
causal links in the analysis can not easily compete with the simplistic appeal of the
neoliberal and development discourses that free markets always work best and that
submerging economies are to blame for their own plight.'
The connections between Mexico's economic austerity and social stresses are
apparent. The rich live very well in Mexico City, but they live in gilded cages, often
afraid to walk the streets of their own city by day or night. This is not out of fear of
mere robbery, but fear of kidnapping. The wave of kidnappings sweeping the
Mexican capital is not politically motivated in the strict sense, but economically
motivated. 98 Some of the ransoms are as little as $100 or less. This kind of

92. Galbraith, supra note 39, at 184.
93. For instance, Professor Pouncy has shown how the underlying, but flawed assumptions of neoclassical

economic thought prevent legal scholars from generating a complete understanding of the process of financial
innovation. See Charles R. P. Pouncy, "Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives," 51 SMU

L REV. 505, 556-74 (1998) (dominant narnatives often serve to marginalize heterodox post-Keynesian theories that
are based on more realistic assumptions).
94. See STUART CORBRIDGE, DEBT AND DEVELOPMENT(1993) (dominant narrative interpretations of the
third world debt crisis often reflect normative and/or flawed assumptions about development and global economic
structures); LARRY ALAN BEAR & RITA MALDONADO-BEAR, FREE MARKETS, FINANCE, ETHICS, AND LAW(1994).
95. Similarly, private legal challenges to the Federal Reserve System have been dismissed for lack of

standing because the plaintiffs could not convince the cours that the Federal Reserve's open market operations are
causally connected to rising interest rates on private loans and to slower economic growth. See Committee for

Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System," 766 F.2d 538, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Bryan v. Federal Open Market Committee, 235 F. Supp. 877, 881-82 (D.Mont. 1964). See also Mark F. Bernstein,

Note, '"he Federal Open Market Committee and the Sharing of Governmental Power With Private Citizens," 75
VA. L REV. 111 (1989).

96. Stephen Zamora, "Capital Flight and the Creditworthiness of Developing Countries," 83 Am. Soc'Y
INT'L L PRoc. 87, 100-105 (1989). Establishment economists often acknowledge the same chain of events, but
reach different conclusions about causation. See Michael Mussa & Moris Goldstein, Symposium,"The Integration
of World Capital Madrets," in Changing Capital Markets: Implications for Monetary Policy 292 (Federal Reserve

Bank of Kansas City, 1993).
97. See ROBERT HEILBRONER AND WILUIAM MELBERO, THE CRISIS OF VISION IN MODERN ECONOMIC
THOUGIr(1995); DONALD M. MCCLOSKEY, KNOWLEDGE AND PERSUASION IN ECONOMICS(1994); DONALD M.
MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS (1985).

98. See Mary Sutter, "Crime Wave Continues to Grip Capital of Mexico, Posing Threat to U.S. Business,"
J. OF COMMERCE, Aug. 25, 1998, at IA; Roger Cowe, "Kidnapping: The World's Top Growth Industry,"TE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 9, 1998, at 2.
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disturbing social disintegration" has been accompanied by stagnation in real wages
and incomes, greater stratifications in wealth and income, and persistently high
levels of joblessness, underemployment and poverty.'l°
The Mexican government's solutions and the advice of the IMF continue to
impose a dismal austerity of fiscal retrenchment, cutbacks in public subsidies, and
frighteningly high interest rates which have greatly undermined private sector
activity.'0 ' This again suggests the need for greater humility and a reexamination of
whether NAFTA's liberalization of short-term portfolio investment, the Mexican
peso bailout, and the IMF austerity program have actually been such great success
stories.
V.

HOT MONEY AND THE "TEQUILA EFFECT"

While the peso collapse and ensuing economic austerity program brought
hardship to Mexican society, these events should also be seen as the origin of many
of the most serious global financial difficulties."m The term "Tequila Effect" has
been used to describe the adverse impact of the peso collapse on the currencies of
other emerging market economies.0 3 According to the IMFs own surveys, this
Tequila effect spread throughout Latin America and East Asia as early as mid1995.'° Asian financial markets began to decline in January 1995 "when pressures
on Mexico began to intensify." 5 The most pronounced market pressures zeroed in
on the Thai baht,' 6 followed by other foreign currencies.' 7
This was the very beginning of the "Asian Flu," the severe and sudden collapse
of a vast portion of the global economy. For many years, Asian developing
countries relied less than Latin developing countries on foreign borrowing from
commercial sources, at high or variable interest rates, or in dollar-denominated
debt."c But as Asian developing countries began competing for foreign investment,
many of them dismantled controls on short-term capital inflows and became
increasingly susceptible to sudden outflows. East Asia was generally transformed

99. See Tun Padgeu, "Cop Crisis," TIa, Aug. 24,1998, at 14; Sam Dillon, "Murderin Mexico: Reformers
Uncover Police Plot," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at AS.
100. "World Economic and Social Survey 1997," supra note 76, at 34-35 (recession in Mexico fueled sharp
increase in open unemployment and poverty rates); "Statistics on Poverty and Income Distribution" (International
Labour Organization, Geneva, 1996); Suchlicki, supra note 76.
101. The economic austerity also impacts the country's cultural life in countless ways. See Henry Tricks.
"Mexico considers an end to food and power subsidies," FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at 4; and Julia Preston,
"A Museum In Mexico Suddenly Shuts Down," N.Y. TIMES. Sept. 23, 1998, at BI ("Mexico's finest modem art
museum was another victim of austerity and recession").
102. Ricardo French-Davis, "Policy Implications of the Tequila Effect,"l:2 CHALLENGE 15(1998).
103. Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 52, at 571-72.
104. Folkerts-Landau, supra note 2, at 67.
105. Id.
106. Philip Shenon, "A Bad Week In the Asian Markets, Too," N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 16,1995, at DI.
107. Ramon Moreno,"What Caused East Asia's Financial CrisisT'Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco
Letter, No.98-24 (Aug. 7, 1998) (collapse of Thai baht in July 1997 set off unprecedented financial crisis in East
Asia); Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, "Of World Markets, None an Island," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999,
at Al, A8.
108. Azizali F. Mohammed, "Contrasting External Debt Experience: Asia and Latin America," in BEYOND
ADJUSTMENT: TBm AsIAN EXPERIENCE 106-112 (Paul Streten ed. International Monetary Fund 1988). Many IMF
analysts did not see the storm approaching over Asia until it acutally broke. Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at
309 (dismissing "hot money" concerns for Asian countries).
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from a traditionally conservative financial region to one that relied heavily on shortterm private borrowing at market interest rates. This transformation accelerated
during the 1990's, encouraged by the neoliberal agenda of the Clinton administration" ° and private financial interests."'
When the inevitable sudden outflow of short-term portfolio capital occurred,'
currencies fell throughout Asia, including Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Hong Kong, threatening the already weak Japanese
economy, and putting pressure on the Chinese yuan." 2 Exacerbating the hot money
outflows was the dynamic of competitive devaluations of currencies, so destructive
during the Great Depression, in which "beggar thy neighbor"currency price wars
throw entire regional economies into a downward spiral.1 3 As one economist
suggested, never before in economic history has so large a part of the world fallen
4
so fast as Asia in the past few years."
As the Asian Flu spread westward, the Russian ruble collapsed," 5 creating the
prospect of social unrest and political turmoil in a country of vital geopolitical
strategic importance." 6 The potential social and political turmoil in other
submerging countries should also not be underestimated." 7
The Russian bear market quickly threatened confidence in Western bull markets
and other emerging markets." 8 For example, a collapse in Brazil, the new front line

109. A prime mover of the financial neoliberal agenda has been Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin, former
chairman of Goldman Sachs & Company, an investment bank with a direct interest in capital account liberalization.
See Nicholas D. Kristof & David E. Sanger, "How U.S. Wooed Asia To Let Cash Flow In," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1999, at Al, A10; Gillian Tett, "Japan may open up short-term securities," FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 26, 1998, at
I (Japan to open short-term government debt market to foreign investment, in response to Rubin demands); Greta
Steyn, "Rubin Urges S. Africa to Embrace Globalisation," FINANCIAL TIMES, July 15, 1998, at 6.
110. Robert T. Parry. "Development of Financial Services in the Asia Pacific: Issues and
Opportunitics,"Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Letter, No. 96-18 (June 7, 1996) (Parry is president and
chief executive officer of the privately-owned Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco).
111. See Peter John, "International bank loans to Asia in $51.7bn downturn," FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 30,
1998, at 18 (citing figures published by the Bank for International Settlements of a $51.7 billion (or 14%) drop in
bank lending to Asia in first half of 1998); Martin Meyer, "The Asian Disease: Plausible Diagnoses, Possible
Remedies: Regulation of Cross-Border Intetbank Lending and Derivatives Trade," Public Policy Brief No. 44
(Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Annandale-on Hudson, 1998).
112. See Seth Faison, "China's Economic Boss Resists Pressure to Devalue Currency," N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
1, 1997, at AS; Ramon Moreno, "Lessons from Thailand,"Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco Letter, No. 97-33
(Nov. 7, 1997); Sheryl WuDunn, "As Japan Goes, So Goes the Neighborhood," N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1998, at C8;
Seth Faison, "Beijing on the Brink?," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1997, at Al0.
113. Kenneth Kasa, "Contractionary Effects of Devaluation," Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco Letter,
No. 98-34 (Nov. 13, 1998); Kenneth Kasa, "Export Competition and Contagious Currency Crises," Federal Reserve
Bank of San Fransisco Letter, No. 98-1 (Jan. 16, 1998).
114. See Paul Krugman,"Saving Asia: It's Tane to Get Radical," FORTiUNE, Sept. 7, 1998, at 75; EDDY LEE,
THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRiSIS: THE CHALLENGE FOR SOCIAL POuCY (1998).
115. See David E. Sanger, "Next Asian Crisis?" N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998, at A12; See also Donald G.
McNeil Jr., "A Fierce Run on the Rand Shocks South Africa," N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1998, at Cl; Avi Machlis and
Alan Beattie, "Falling Shekel Forces Interest Rate Rise" FINANctALTIMES, Oct. 27, 1998, at 6.
116. See Mead, supra note 55, at 162("Since the end of the Cold War, Western policy toward Russia has
been a textbook case in how to drive a people to facism"); Charles William Maynes, "Squandering Triumph," 78:1
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 15 (1999).

117. Seth Mydans, "New Violence Puts Indonesia's Military as a Crossroads," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1998,
at Al.
118. See Diana Jean Schemo, "Possible I.M.F. Bailout Stirs Brazilians' Bitter Memories of 80's," N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 1998, at A17 (speedy transmission of Russian crisis to hot money outflow from Brazil); Peter Fritsch
& Michael M. Phillips, "Back to the Brink: Brazil's Devaluation Reignites Global Fears Of Spreading Malaise,"
WAIL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1999, at Al.
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in this global battleground," 9 would certainly pose a threat to Mexico. Brazil and
Argentina are paying much higher interest rates as a result.2 This is rather
disturbing since Argentina has been hailed by neoliberals as the model of a very
well run economy. 21 It has brought down its inflation rate to near zero and its fiscal
deficit to approximately 1% of its gross domestic product.' " Economic and
financial fallout could even wash ashore in the U.S. and Western Europe. 2 3 What
is most troubling about the dynamics of currency contagion is that the market seems
to indiscriminately discipline bad as well as good economic behavior, and that the
punishment is far too excessive."2
This is the new political dynamic of our times, in which sovereign governments
have lost their ability to pursue policies of high economic growth and full
employment." Mexico is a prime example. It has surrendered virtually all controls
on hot money capital flows; it has freed its central bank from democratic accountability; and it continues to raise interest rates to keep capital from fleeing. 6 In
early 1999, as Mexico's interbank interest rates rose above 40 percent, debt burdens
also rose; yet, "faster depreciation of the peso raise[d] foreign debt service
payments in peso terms, which also put pressure on the public purse," and
necessitated further deep cutbacks in government spending for the poor and
struggling middle-class.'
Yet tight monetary policy and higher interest rates

119. The IMF eventually pieced together a $41 billion pre-emptive bailout of Brazil. See Stephen Fidler &
Geoff Dyer, "Brazil receives $41bn in aid." FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 15, 1998, at !. But the assistance package was
inherently flawed since it did not address the "hot money" problem. See Timothy A. Canova, "Why Brazil Will
Fall," 10:11 ECONOMIC REFORM 16(1998); Jeffrey Sachs and Steven Radelet. "Next Stop: Brazil," N.Y. TIMES.
Oct. 14, 1998, at A25; Michael M. Weinstein, "Economic Scene: A Few Billion Dollar Fix that Won't Untimately
Cure Brazil". N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998. at C2.
120. See John Barham, "Brazil Lifts Rates As Hard Currency Flees," FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 28, 1999, at 9;
Geoff Dyer, "Brazil Pushes Up Interest Rates as Real Keeps Falling," FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999, at 1; Ken
Warn, "Argentina Forced to Pay Higher Interest Rates," FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at 3; Geoff Dyer, "Dollar
Outflows Put Pressure on Brazil," Financial Times, Oct 16, 1998, at 6 (in 2 months since Russian crisis Brazil lost
about $25 billion in reserves from capital flight).
121. See Edward C. Snyder, "The Menem Revolution in Argentina: Progress Toward a Hemispheric Free
Trade Area," 29 TEXAS INr'L LJ. 95 (1994); Steve H. Hanke, "Don't Cry for Me,"l 0 INT'L ECONOMY 46 (1996).
122. Argentina's currency board model presents particular danger that a slowdown in capital inflows would
quickly translate into loss of reserves by the Central Bank, contraction of the money supply, sharply higher interest
rates, and economic slowdown. Alberto F. Aides, "Currency Boards and Its Implications for Argetina," ECONOMIC
RESEARCH 21,22 (Goldman Sachs, Feb. 1995).
123. See Jonathan Fuesofinger, "Others' Risk Of Contagion From Brazil," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at Cl;
Clifford Krauss, "Argentines Suffering From Brazil Crisis," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1999, at A8; Anthony Faiola,
"Ecuadoran Economy Near Collapse; Bank Closures, Proposed Austerity Measures Trigger Widespread Protests,"
WASH.POST, March 17, 1999, at A22.
124. Joseph Stiglitz, "An Economic Taint South America Doesn't Deserve," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at
A31; Alan Greenspan, Remarks to annual meeting of the Securities Industry Association, Nov.5, 1998
<http:\\www.bog.frb.us/boarddoc s/speeches/curent/19981105.htmb> ("market discipline today is clearly far more
draconian and less forgiving than twenty or thirty years ago").
125. For a representative example of the dilemma often faced by governments of developing countries, see
IRWIN P. STOTZKY, SILENCING THE GUNS IN HAITI: THE PROMISE OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185 (1997)
(Haitian president Preval had "arduous task of balancing two constituencies, one of them being his domestic
political followers who oppose free-market reforms, and the other being the international donor nations seeking
market reforms").
126. Gerardo Zuniga Villasenor, "Mexico: Anti-Contagion Defences," OXFORD ANALYTICA DAILY BRIEF,
Jan. 18, 1999 (copy on file with author) (central bank was made independent of political direction in April 1994).
127. lit (providing that the measures include tax on telephone service and withdrawal of subsidy on tortillas,
a food staple. Meanwhile tax revenues continue to decline since the global contagion and austerity programs have

undermined the price of Mexican oil exports.)
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remain the only politically acceptable solutions to the threat of capital flight, even
though such solutions have proven to only compound a country's problems. 28
Capital controls - government restrictions on the flow of capital between
countries - represent an alternative solution. But capital controls are dismissed as
an option because "monetary authorities are ideologically opposed to non-market
instruments" and by the excuse that Mexico's long border with the U.S. "would
render them useless."' 29 But these obstacles may merely be another way of saying
that the power of private financial markets, and lack of U.S. leadership and
cooperation, stand in the way of the use of alternative policy instruments.
A country that ignores the threat of hot money and the dictates of private
financial markets faces the very real danger of capital flight and a sharply falling
currency. Scholars and journalists have referred to this dilemma as a "dual
constituency conundrum" which pits the interests of voters against foreign currency
traders and hedge fund managers "who conduct moment-to-moment referendums"
0
on the economic and financial policies of developing and developed nations alike."
How did we get to this kind of a world in which markets punish so severely while
sovereign governments are rendered impotent? First, the lessons from Mexico's
collapse were not learned. 3' The same causes of Mexico's collapse have been
playing out in submerging country after submerging country around the world ever
since the Mexican peso collapse.' The dismal chain of events includes the
liberalization of capital accounts, the dependence on foreign investment, the
dependence on a particular type of foreign investment (short term "hot money"
portfolio investment), the need to maintain high real interest rates and overvalued
exchange rates to attract and maintain sufficient levels of foreign investment, the
adverse impact of overvalued exchange rates and high interest rates on a country's
trade and budget deficits, and then the inevitable panic and rush to the door, the
sudden outflow of capital, often triggered by an unforeseen event, but made
inevitable33 by the unsustainable dependence on hot money to finance burgeoning
deficits.

128.

ld. See ahso, Hery, Tricks, "Inflation Blow for Mexican Central Bank," FINANCIAL Tmes, Jan.8, 1999,

at 3.
129. Id.
130. Stotzky, supra note 125. Presidential candidates (and even coup leaders) of every political stripe now
feel compelled to campaign on Wall Street, and to meet with private bankers by video link-ups and at the annual
IMF-Wordd Bank meeting. David J. Rothkopf, "Whistle-Stops on Wall Street," N.Y. TIMEs, March 8, 1999, at A19.
For more on the erosion of traditional national sovereignty, see also Miles Kahler, International Institutions and
the Political Integration xi, xviii (1995); Canova, supra note 7, at 1351-52.
131. IMF analysts committed to capital account liberalization apparently refused to see the dangers building
throughout Asia and other emerging market countries. See also Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 309 n.5 I.
132. The global currency contagion has also reduced demand for commodities, further undermining the
economic and financial conditions within deficit countries. See David Barboza, "The Brazil Effect On
Commodities," N.Y. TIMPES, Jan. 27, 1999, at Cl; Henry Tricks, "Mexican budget hit by cut in oil prices,"
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998, at 4; Jonathan Fuerbringer, "Commodities' Price Slide Victimizes Economies of
Several Nations," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1998,at Cl.
133. Cynthia C. Lichtcnstein, "Dealing with Sovereign Liquidity Crises: New International Initiatives for the
New World of Volatile Capital Flows To and From Emerging Markets," 29 McGEORGE LREv. 1 (1998); Gary
Weiss, et al, "The Man Who Moves Markets," BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 23,1993, at 50,53 (George Soros view that
currency contagion resulting from overvalued currencies, tight monetary policy, high real interest rates); George
Soros, "The Capitalist Threat," ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1997, at 45.
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This neoliberal financial regime has been built on a mixture of free market
ideology and crass economic self-interest." 4 For instance, consider the emergence
of hedge funds as players in the global financial system. A hedge fund is an
unregulated fund of less than 100 wealthy investors who seek to move their capital
around the globe in a nanosecond.' 35 It was revealing to see Alan Greenspan, the
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, in response to questions from the
House Banking Committee in the fall of 1998, acknowledged that he did not know
even the number of hedge funds that were presently operating in the U.S. or
offshore. 36 His ignorance on such a matter may not be entirely unexpected." 7
Hedge funds are not regulated and are not even registered with the Federal
Reserve.' Greenspan opined that there could be hundreds of other Long Term
Capitals out there ready to fail or in the process of failing, 39 which goes far in
explaining why the Federal Reserve's Open Market Committee held an emergency
meeting in mid-October 1998 to add liquidity to financial markets in a hurry."
It is increasingly clear to a growing number of economists that capital account
liberalization is the primary factor within the control of policymakers that is
contributing to financial and economic turmoil around the world.' 4' As countries
dismantled their capital controls, there was a huge expansion in the volume of
capital flows. The daily volume of global foreign exchange trading now exceeds
$1.5 trillion." In 1977 global foreign exchange trading was about 3-1/2 times the
volume of annual global exports; today it is about 64 times that amount. In 1977
134. Keynes may have been overly optimistic when he concluded that "the power of vested interests is vastly
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas." JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY
OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 383 (1964 ed.).

135. Hedge funds operate under Investment Company Act of 1940 exemption for funds of less than 100
private investors; are incorporated offshore; or operate under a 1966 amendment to Federal securities laws that
exempts from regulation funds with fewer than 500 "sophisticated" institutions or individuals in which the
individuals invest more than $5 million and institutions invest more than $25 million. Leslie Wayne, "Congress
to Debate Greater Oversight of Hedge Funds," N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 1,1998, at Cl. C3; Stevenson, supra note 40. at
B2.
136. Alan Greenspan, Testimony to Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of
Representatives (Oct. 1, 1998) <http:\\www.bog.frb.us/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19981001.html>. Greenspan
warned that any direct U.S. regulation of hedge funds would drive the funds to offshore jurisdiction.; See Canova,
supra note 7, at 1306-09 (race to the bottom necessitates harmonization of financial regulations of competing
jursidictions); John Steele Gonon, "History Repeats in Finance Company Bailouts," WALL ST. J., Oct 7,1998, A22
(reach of regulators must extent to the private financial institutions they ae supposed to oversee). See also Reed
Abelson, "Survey Shows Big Growth In Hedge Fund Popularity," N.Y. TIMES, OCL 1, 1998, at C3.
137. On the many victims of Greenspan, including his involvement in the Savings and Loan fiasco, see
MARTIN MAYER, THE BANKERS: THE NEXT GENERATION 370, 402-03 (1997); ALEXANDER COCKBURN & KEN
SILVERSTEIN, WASHINGTON BABYLON 276-80 (1996).

138. See notes 27-28, 135-136infra.
139. See note 136 infra Jacob M. Schlesinger & Michael Schroeder, "Greenspan's Hedge-Fund Portrait is
Stark," WALL ST. J. Oct 2, 1998, at A3. Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, "Investors Fear Trouble at Another Hedge
Fund," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at CI; Stephen Fidler, "Greenspan sees signs of an end to 'investor
fright,"'FINANCtALTIMES, Nov. 6, 1998, at 20.
140. Barnhart, supra note 46; Stevenson, supra note 40, and accompanying text; Gretchen Morgenson,
"Investors View Fed's Rate Cut as Too Timid," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998,at C1.
141. Jagdish Bhagwati, "The Capital Myth." 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 7 (1998); KEVIN PHILLIPS, ARROGANT
CAPrrAL(1 994); Greider, supra note 22; Martin Wolf, "Wisdom of free flows questioned," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct.
2. 1998. World Economy and Finance Survey, VI; Nicholas D. Kristof, "As Free-Flowing Capital Sinks Nations.
Experts Prepare to 'Rethink System,"' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20,1998, at 6; Robert Kutmer, "Global Financial Crashes
are Excesses of Free Markets," ALBQ.J., Sept.1 1, 1998, at A16.
142. David Felix, "On Drawing General Policy Lessons From Recent Latin American Currency Crises," 20:2
J. POST KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 191,200(1998).
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the ratio of central banks' global official reserves to daily foreign exchange turnover
was about 15 days; today it is only about one day.143 Therefore the combined total
of all central bank reserves equals only about one day's worth of foreign exchange
trading.
This begs the question, what chance does a single central bank have to protect
its currency by open market interventions in the face of a sustained market reaction
against that currency?
When a central bank intervenes in isolation to support its currency against a
sustained sell-off, it is in essence handing its foreign reserves over to the speculators, resulting in heavy losses for the central bank and huge profits for private
speculators,'" including hedge funds, foreign exchange departments of commercial
banks and other financial institutions. 1' As one market observer noted:
Currency traders have grown rich by taking positions in the market opposite of
those of central banks.... The foreign exchange traders make large profits from
central bank interventions, which far from stabilizing markets, causes them to
be more volatile.... Indeed, these days trader and central banker are often one

and the same. At least half a dozen former governors of the Federal Reserve
now hold high-paying jobs on Wall Street, where they provide advice to
currency and bond traders.'"
How nice it must be for central bankers and their research economists to look
forward to such promising future career options with private financial institutions;
and how convenient that the same private financial institutions have such an interest
in keeping their future employees actively intervening in the currency and bond
market.147 This symbiotic relationship between the regulators and private financial
institutions raises important questions about the political process 148 and the
democratic accountability of central banks. 49 It also casts doubt on the efficacy of
central bank interventions in currency and other markets." ° But the IMF's other

143. Id.
144. See Jane D'Arista & Tom Schlesinger, "Reforming the Privatized International Monetary System," 2
FOMC ALERT 1, 2 (Dec. 22,1998); Sam Dillon, "Mexico's Central Bank Fails in Attempt to Prop Up Peso," N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 1998, at C4.
145. Greider, supra note 22, at 240-41 (recounting how speculator George Soros had broken the Bank of
England's defense of the British pound in September 1992, and made nearly $1 billion in profit in the process).
146. Michael Lewis, "For Love of Money: Why Central Bankers and Speculators Need Each Other," 74:2
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 137, 139, 141 (1995) (reviewing GREGORY J. MILLMAN, THE VANDALS' CROWN: HOW REBEL
CURRENCY TRADERS OVERTHREW THE WORLD'S CENTRAL BANKS (1995)). See also STEVEN SOLOMON, THE
CONFIDENCE GAME (1995); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS (1997).
147. See Simon Romero, "Brazilian Central Bank Plans A Currency Insider Inquiry," N.Y. TIMES, April 1,
1999, at C6; Simon Romero, "As Brazil Devalued, Some Got Rich," N.Y. TIMES, March 26, 1999, at C4. See also
Richard K. Lyons, "Explaining Trading Volume in Foreign Exchange: Lessons from Tokyo,"No. 97-38 (Dec. 26,
1997) (dealers who receive advance knowledge of a central bank's currency intervention operations "has superior
information for forecasting exchange rate movements").
148. Political scientists have long been concerned with such dynamics of revolving doors, iron triangles, and
agency capture by private regulated industries and their interest groups. See D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., ET AL,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 258, 522-23 (1992); THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 33-35, 58(1979).
149. Timothy A. Canova, "Law School's Blindfold: The Downsizing of the American Dream," BROOK. L
DIG. 19, 25-29 (1996); Bernstein, supra note 95; Harold J. Krent, "Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:
Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government," 85 N.W. UNIv. L REV.
62, 84-85 n.66 (1990); See also John Hart Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-134 (1980); DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER wrrltour RESPONSIBLIT=Y (1993).
150. D'Arista & Schlesinger, supra note 144. See also Milton Friedman, "'he Case for Overhauling the
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preferred policy alternative, that of raising interest rates ever higher, also ultimately
fails to prop up the currency. Consider the case of Sweden in the early 1990s. The
Swedish currency, the Krona, came under speculative attack. The Riksbank,
Sweden's central bank, tried to defend the currency by raising interest rates. The
Riksbank raised the overnight interest rate to over 500 percent over a two-week
period' Of course, the Swedish economy and banking system collapsed under the
weight of such interest rates, and the strategy utterly failed anyway in its primary
objective to support the value of the Krona. Trying to defend the value of a
currency with high interest rates is a very dangerous course of action. Along the
way, those high interest rates compound the financial and economic crisis,
contribute to passive government budget deficits,' and to deepening recession.
The World Bank acknowledged these dangers in the fall of 1998 when it distanced
itself from the IMF. In a rather unprecedented split between such institutions, the
World Bank publicly blamed the IMF and U.S. Treasury for making the global
financial crisis worse and increasing the hardship for millions of people
5 3 as a result
of programs of economic austerity, high interest rates, and recession.
V.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE NEOLIBERAL FINANCIAL REGIME: THE
CONTAGION OF NEOLIBERAL REFORM

The proliferation of short-term capital flows has occurred because of conscious
government decisions to liberalize their capital accounts, and to abolish any and all
kinds of controls on short-term portfolio capital flows."M The Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (the Articles), otherwise known as
the 1944 Bretton Woods Agreement,' 5 contain a specific provision, Article VI, that
expressly provides member countries with a very important policy tool, the right to
impose exchange controls and restrictions on capital flows." 6 According to Article
VI, "Members may exercise such controls as are necessary to regulate international

Fed," CHALLENGE, 5(July-Aug.1985) (criticizing the Federal Reserve for"churning" its accounts by unnecessary
and excessive buying and selling of government securities to add profits to the bond-dealing operations of its
private constituency).
151. Timothy A. Canova, "The Swedish Model Betrayed," 37:3 CHAU.ENGE 36 (1994).
152. Passive deficits result from slow economic growth, underutilization of resources, declining tax revenues,

and/or rising interest costs. Active deficits, on the other hand, result from government spending more than it
collects in taxes at full employment. See Timothy A. Canova & Lynn Turgeon, "Fighting the Wrong Deficit." in
MELTDOWN, supra note 182, at 206-07; See Gillian Tett, "Japan Warns of $82.6bn tax shortfall," FINANCIAL.
TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1998, at 1 (tax shortfall due to economic slowdown).
153. David E.Sanger,"U.S. and LM.F. Made Asia Crisis Worse, World Bank Finds," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
1998, at Al; Mark Landler, "Grim Assessment by U.N. Of Economic Slide in Asia," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998,
at A8 (the International Labor Organization reported dramatic worsening in social and economic conditions
throughout Asia); James D. Wolfensohn, "The Other Crisis," Address to Annual Meeting of the IMF and World

Bank (Oct.6, 1998)http:/twww.worldbank.org/htnl/extdr/am98/jdw-splam98-en.html.; See also David E.Sanger,
"As Economies Fail, the I.M.F. Is Ripe with Recriminations,"N.Y.TIMES, Oct.2, 1998, at AI.
154. History has been repeated with the liberalization of capital flows. Unregulated capital flows contributed
to the global financial and economic instability of the Great Depression. See JOHN GRAY, FALSE DAWN: THE
DELUSIONS OF GLOBAL CAPrrALISM (1999).

155. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund [hereinafter Articles], Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, as amended, May 31, 1968, 20 U.S.T. 2775, 726 U.N.T.S. 266, as
amended, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, 15 LLM. 546, as amended June 28, 1990, 31 LLM. 1307.

156. Id Article VI, Section 3. See Franhois Gianviti, "The IMF and the Liberalization of Capital Markets,"
19 HOUS.J.INT'L L 773, 776 (1997).
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capital movements, but no member may exercise these controls in a manner which
will restrict payments for current transactions..." 137
This is an important distinction between capital and current transactions. The
Articles define current transactions as including payments due in connection with
foreign trade, interest due on loans, and net income from other investments, but not
payments made for the purpose of transferring capital. 5 ' The Articles consider
current transactions (such as payments for goods and repatriation of profits)'59 as
essential for the smooth operation of international trade, and member countries were
ordinarily obligated under Article VIII to avoid restrictions on current payments.' 60
Article VIII requires members to consult with and obtain the approval of the IMF
to impose restrictions on current transactions. 6 ' Article IV gives the IMF
surveillance powers over a wide range of members' economic and financial
policies. 62 In contrast, Article VI restrictions on capital transactions require no such
IMF consultations or surveillance.
The Articles are very explicit in favoring the use of restrictions on capital
transactions over restrictions on current transactions. 163 The chief negotiators at
Bretton Woods, Harry Dexter White, the assistant U.S. Treasury Secretary, and
John Maynard Keynes, the great British economist, saw the Article VI provision as
a crucial instrument to control the kind of speculative capital flows that had
occurred before World War It and had destabilized the global economy during the
Great Depression.' Keynes supported Article VI as "a permanent arrangement
[that] accords to every member government the explicit right to control all capital
movements. What used to be heresy is now endorsed as orthodox... It follows that
our right to control the domestic capital market is secured on firmer foundation than
ever before." 65
Article VI was not just a theoretical power; capital controls were widely used
throughout Western Europe to shield those countries from speculative capital flows
during post-war reconstruction." 6 In fact, for most Western European countries,
capital controls remained in place throughout most of the 1950's, and for some

157. Articles, supra note 155, Article VI, Section 3.

158. Articles, supra note 155, at Article XXX(d). The payment or liquidation of the principal of an
investment, including a short-term portfolio investment, would be considered as a capital transaction.
159. Payment of interest due on loans and net income from other investments would constitute repatriation
of profits. See KErI S. ROSErNN, FOREIGN bwEsTMENT IN BRAZL (1991) (regarding difference between
repatriation of profits and capital).

160. Articles, supra note 155, VIII, Section 2. The only exceptions to this prohibition against current
restrictions are Article VIL Section 3 (b), the "scarce cur-ency clause", and Article XIV. Section 2, which provides
for a transitional period until full current account convertibility. For more on the scarce currency clause, see notes
288-291 infra, and accompanying text.
161. Articles, supra note 155, VIl, Section 2.
162. Articles. supra note 155, TV.

163. Articles, supra note 155,VI, Section 1(a) also gives the IMF power to demand that "a member to
exercise such controls (on capital transfers]"Gianviti. supra note 156,776-77.
164. ROBERT W. DIMAND, "Bretton Woods," in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS 50-53
(1997). At Bretton Woods, White chaired commission on the IMF, Keynes the commission on the World Bank,
and Eduardo Suarez of Mexico the commission on other forms of financial cooperation. See Gray, supra note 154.

165. "Cooling Down Hot Money," 2 ECONOMIC JusTicE REPA.4
(Ecumnenical Coalition for Economic Justice,
Toronto, June 1994). Keynes referred to short-term capital movements as "fugitive funds" and attempted to
construct a system of national exchange controls between both the sending and receiving countries. See Zarnom,
supra note 96, 101.

166. Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 252. See also notes 276-278 infra and accompanying text.
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countries until the early 1990's.167 Restrictions on hot money capital flows meant
Western European countries could pursue high growth and full employment, two
of the explicit purposes of the Bretton Woods Agreement, 16 without being overly
concerned about the possibility of speculative runs on their currencies.
In recent years, the Article VI policy tool has been undermined and eroded by the
IMF itself, through the adoption of a program of capital account liberalization.169
As recently as the spring of 1998, the IMF was discussing a possible amendment to
the Articles to provide for explicit jurisdiction over the process of capital account
The IMF has focused the burden of adjustment on deficit
liberalization. 1
countries, while virtually ignoring the dynamics of hot money speculative flows that
victimize those same countries."" Without an explicit mandate and despite the
Article VI provision, the IMF has effectively pushed capital liberalization through
its surveillance, financing, and technical assistance activities.
It is rather perverse and ironic that at the very moment that a country is sinking
under the weight of the hot money problem, it must bend once again to permit even
further capital account liberalization as a condition for badly-needed IMF financial
assistance.' The schizophrenic nature of relations is captured in the so-called
Letters of Intent, drafted by and yet formally addressed to the RMF, which list the
many steps that the submerging country promises to undertake in exchange for IMF
aid, including economic austerity, privatization, and liberalization."'
In pushing capital account liberalization, the IMF has been responding to the
demands of capital-exporting nations and their private banking and financial
constituencies. 7 6 Likewise, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is the
direct descendant of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has
strongly pushed the same liberalization agenda.'" The Organization of Economic

167. Id.
(among purposes of IMF were to "facilitate the expansion and
168. Articles, supranote 155, at Article I(ii)
balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels
of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary

objectives of economic policy").
169. Sara Kane, "Seminar Discusses the Orderly Path to Capital Account Liberalization," 27 IMF SURVEY
81.83 (International Monetary Fund, March 23, 1998); "Capital Movements Under an Amendment of the IMF's
Articles," ANNUAL REPORT 1998 74 (International Monetary Fund 1998).
170. Id.
and accompanying text concerning the asymmetrical burden of adjustment on
171. See notes 270-271 infra

deficit countries.
172. Kane, supra note 169.
173. Larry Rohter, "New L M.F. Aid Pact Further Limits Brazil," N.Y.TIMEs, March 9,1999, Cl; Geoff Dyer,
"Brazil vows to continue privatization," FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1998, at 7.

174. Some

of

these

Letters

of

Intent

can

be

found

on

the

IMP's

website

at

<http'//www.imf.org/extemal/npl/oi>.
175. Since the U.S. is the dominant power within the IMP, it is not surprising that this agenda is often closely

linked with U.S. policy. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "Asians Worry That U.S. Aid Is a New Colonialism," N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at A4. See also photo of South Korean protest march against policies imposed by the IMF
in which protester was holding a sign that read, "LM.F., I'M Fired?" N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at C1.
176. For instance, Ramon Moreno, "GATSand Banking in the Pacific Basin,"Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco Letter, No. 94-19 (May 13, 1994) (adoption of General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) at

Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations expected to open Pacific Basin economies to international
banking; even though it could raise problems related to "speculative capital flows").
177. See Joint Statement by the Heads of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World
Trade Organization, IMF New Brief No. 98/37, Oct. 16, 1998 (urging further liberalization and integration of
financial markets); "Ftnancial Services Trade, Capital Flows and Financial Instability," Staff Working Paper ERAD
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Cooperation and Development (OECD), a group of about 29 of the more developed
nations, has actively pushed for free capital mobility among its members through
its own Code of Liberalisation of Capital Accounts (the Code).'78 The Code covers
a wide range of capital movements, including hot money flows such as operations
in securities, money markets, and foreign exchange. 7 9

Mexico's membership in the OECD merits particular attention,8 because of its
significance in terms of the Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) risk-based
capital requirements, also know as the Basle Accord. 18' The Basle Accord put a zero
weighting on credit risk for the central government debt of all OECD countries,
which by mid-1994 included Mexico. 8 2 Therefore, at the time of the Mexican peso
crash, banks from around the globe could hold Mexican government debt securities
without providing any capital reserves for credit risk. This combined OECD-BIS
stamp of approval was certainly a premature inducement to free flows in a
particularly volatile form of capital. This capital, mainly short-term Mexican
government debt, resulted in significant losses for U.S. and other banks and
necessitated a multibillion dollar bailout package.' 83
The OECD has also been pushing negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) for OECD members and non-members. According to the OECD,
the MAI is based on the Code and would "provide legal guarantees" for investments, including the making of portfolio investments.18 If enacted, the MAI would
effectively overturn Article VI of the IMF Articles of Agreement on a grand
multilateral scale. For the time being, MAI negotiations have been suspended
because of intense opposition by trade unions and environmental groups concerned
about the broad rights that MAI would grant to corporations to challenge national
laws and regulations.'85

98-12 (World Trade Organization, Geneva, 1998); Guy de Jonquieres, "Liberalization is good for stability, says
WTO study," FINANCiALTIrMS, Dec. 2, 1998, at 9.
178. Cynthia C. Uchtenstein, "Ihe New Financial World of Cross Border Capital Movements: The
International Monetary Fund Agreement in light of the 1994 Mexico Peso Crash," in WEBER, (Hrsg.) WAHRUNG
UND WIRTSCHAFr, DAS FED IM RECHT, FEsTscHRIFr FUR PROFESSOR DR. HUGO J. HAHN, NoMos

VERLASGESELLSCRAFr 191, 195 (1997); Christian Weller, "Global Banking," 3 FOREIGN POLICY INFOCUS 9
(1998).
179. CODE OF LUBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development, 1997)[hereinafter "OECD Code"]. Article l(d) of this Code obligates all OECD
members to "endeavour to extend the measures of liberalisation to all members of the International Monetary
Fund".
180. Mexico became a member of the OECD through accession on May 18, 1994. Id. at 2.
181. Hal S. Scott, "The Competitive Implications of the Basle Capital Accord," 39 ST.LOUIS UNIV. L J. 885
(1995).
182. HAL S.Scorr & PHuIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 268-69 (1998);MELTDOWN: MONEY,
DEBT, AND THE WEALTH OP NATIONS 270, 310 (W. Krehm, ed. COMER Publications 1999). For proposed
revisions in risk management standards for banks, see "Framework for Supervisory Information about Derivatives
and Trading Activities," Joint Report by the BIS Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the Technical
Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (Sept. 1998).
183. Louis Uchitelle, "U.S. Losses In Mexico Assessed," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1994, at A6; Kenneth N.
Gilpin, "Far-Reaching Effects Seen If Mexico Rescue Is Halted," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at Dl.
184. "The Siena Declaration," N.Y.TIMS, Nov. 24, 1998, A7 (declaration of the International Forum on
Globalization); "The Multilateral Agreement on Investment," OECD Policy Brief No. 2-1997, reprinted on Friends
of the Earth web site at <http://www.foe.org/orgs/ga/ten.html>.
185. Samer Iskandar, "France quits investment accord talks," FINANCIALT1MES, Oct. 15, 1998, at 6; Guy
de Jonquieres. "Retreat over OECD pact on investment," FINANCIAL TIMEs, Oct. 21, 1998, at 9; Friends of the
Earth web site, supra note 184.
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While the OECD's particular multilateral attempt to enshrine capital liberalization in international law has not met with immediate success, bilateral efforts have.
For the past two decades, developed countries have pressured developing countries
to liberalize their capital accounts through hundreds of bilateral investment treaties,
such as the U.S. State Department's Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program. 6
NAFTA's investment provisions are "a direct descendant of the U.S. model
bilateral investment treaty." ' 7 Not surprisingly, BITs typically define "investment"
to include private debt and equity securities, the raw material of hot money flows.'
By granting U.S. investors the right to freely transfer such investments,' 8 9 the BIT
program has undermined the ability of developing countries to adopt Article VI
restrictions on capital transfers.
The primary objective of developing countries in negotiating a BIT with the U.S.
or some other developed country is to attract foreign investment."' As Dean
Salacuse argues, while the BIT program "purports to create a symmetrical
relationship between the two [contracting] states," in reality an asymmetry exists
since the developing country is in need of, and dependent on, U.S. sources for
scarce capital investment. 9 According to Dean Vandevelde, "Iflor many
developing countries, the BIT represents a tangible way of signaling their
receptivity to foreign investment, and thus may seem to assist in attracting capital
from the United States and other developed countries."'" Consequently, the U.S.
is in a stronger bargaining position to condition other official benefits for the
developing country on that country's agreement to the BIT.'93 Moreover, the BIT
is a "confidence-building" measure that sends a green light to the private investment
community. 94
More than 300 BITs have been signed between developed and developing
nations.'95 As Salcuse notes, "in thirty years, the nations of the world fashioned an
instrument of public international law to create rules for private foreign investments." " By requiring bilateral liberalization of capital flows, the BIT program has
significantly undermined the important policy instrument of capital controls, a
policy option expressly permitted under the IMF Articles of Agreement.)'
186. It was during the time of another neoliberal Democrat, the Carter administration, that the BIT program
was fist launched. See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, "U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Second Wave," 14 MICH.
J. INT'L L 621. 622 (1993).
187. Alvarez, supra note 64, at 303-04. The U.S. has negotiated more than 40 BITs with foreign countries.
For sample and actual U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, see http:/www.state.gov/www.issues/e
conomic/6proto.html.>
188. See Joseph E. Pattison, 'The United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Prototype For Future
Negotiation," 16 CORNELL INT'L L J. 305, 316 (1983); Wayne Sachs, "The New U.S. Bilateral Investment
Treaties," 2 INT'LTAX & BUs,LAW. 192.203-08 (1984).
189. Mark S. Bergman, "Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: An Examination of the Evolution and
Significance of the U.S. Prototype Treaty," 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L & POL 1, 19-20 (1983).
190. Jeswald W. Salacuse, "BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Impact on

Foreign Investment in Developing Countries," 24:3 TilE INT'L LAWYER 655, 661 (1990).
191.

Id. at 663.

192. Vandevelde, supra note 186, at 638.
193. Salacuse, supra note 190, at 661, 663 ("those benefits may include participation in the U.S. foreign

investment insurance program, and U.S. political support and economic assistance").
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 674.
Id. at 655.
Id.
Id.
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Therefore, a multilateral framework for dealing with capital account liberalization
and restrictions has been largely supplanted by bilateral arrangements which reflect
and reproduce the power disparities between capital-exporting countries, private
financial institutions and the developing world.' 9'
VI.

A PATH FOR REFORM

Exchange Rate Stability
It is clear that the liberalization of global capital flows has contributed to the
extreme volatility in exchange rates.'99 Countries have lost their autonomy to pursue
expansionary economic policies as they have been forced to compete for foreign
investment. This has led to the neutralization of fiscal policy and the ascendency of
monetary policy as the one and only policy tool to deal with every policy problem,
from inflation to unemployment and exchange rate stability.' This over-reliance
on monetary policy has in turn contributed to extremely high real interest rates,
slower economic growth, and the general retreat from policies of full
employment.2"'
In 1994, former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker chaired a commission
known as the Bretton Woods Commission. Its work coincided with the 50th
anniversary of the Bretton Woods Conference. The Bretton Woods Commission
concluded:
Since the early 1970's, long-term growth in the major industrial countries has
been cut in half, from about 5 percent a year to about 2.5 percent a year.
Although many factors contributed to this decline in different countries at
different times, low growth has been an international problem, and the loss of
exchange rate discipline has played a part.' 2

A.

The Commission was surprisingly critical of liberalized exchange rates, and
recommended a return to some kind of regime of semi-fixed exchange rates in order
to encourage the growth in global trade and economic growth.2 ' 3
If countries could regain some measure of control over hot money speculative
capital flows, there is a good chance for a return to exchange rate stability. With

198. The bilateral approach of the BIT program is contraly to the multilateral principle of the Bretton Woods
and GATT post-war trading system. See BETH V. YARBROUr3H & ROBERT M. YARBROUGH, COOPERATION AND
GoVENANCE ININTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1992).
199. See MAxwELL WATSON. Er AL, INTERNATIONAL CAPrrAL MARKETS: DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS
13 (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 1988); Bank for International Settlements: 68TH Annual
Report, supra note 66, at 106; Felix,"On Drawing General Policy Lessons From Recent Latin American Currency
Crises," supra note.
200. Timothy A. Canova, "The Macroeconomics of William Vickrey," 40:2 CHALLENGE 95(1997). Fomer
Nobel-laureate Jan Tinbergen often said that we should have at least as many policy tools as there am policy
objectives. See JAN TiNBERGEN, ECONOMIC Poiucy: PRINCWLES AND DESIGN 53-56 (1956).
201. See JAMES MEDOFF & ANDREW HARLESS, THE omED SOcErY (1996); SIDNEY HOMER & RtCttARD
SYLA,'A HISTORY OF INTEREST RATES 386,430 (1991).
202. Bretton Woods Commission. 1994. "Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future," Commission Report,
Washinigton, D.C.: Bretton Woods Commission; Greider, supra note 22, at 250.
203. Id. Raymond F. Mikesell, "Revisiting Bretton Woods," Public Policy Brief no. 24, (Jerome Levy
Economics Institute, Annandale-on-Hudson, 1996); THE BRETrON WooDs-GAfT SYSTEM: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT AFTER FIFrY YEARS (0. Kirshner, ed., M.E.Sharpe 1996).
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such stability, there is also a good chance that countries would be empowered to
once again pursue full employment and a host of other progressive social policy
objectives. Political leaders in Western Europe, particularly in France and Germany,
have recognized the need for exchange rate stability,2 but have had little success
with the Clinton administration'os and have elicited the outright hostility of central
bankers. 2'
In order to reform the global financial system to restore stability in exchange
rates, a return to some kind of regime of limited use of controls or restrictions on
short-term capital inflows is needed. This would entail a reorientation of LMF
policy, but one that may already be in its infancy.
During some of the worst months of the global currency contagion, many
internationalists came to appreciate the kinds of prudential controls on short-term
capital inflows that Chile adopted several years ago.' For instance, a foreign
investor who wanted to invest or lend within Chile had to deposit 30 percent of such
investment or loan into a non-interest bearing account with the central bank for a
full year or pay a 3 percent tax to recover that deposit.' These prudential limits,
known locally as the encage, had the effect of cutting down the incentive for shortterm borrowing from abroad, and thereby reduced Chile's reliance on short-term
capital inflows.2'9
In mid-1998, the established economic orthodoxy was shaken by a high level
defection. MIT economist and free-trader Paul Krugman suddenly came out
publicly in favor of capital and exchange controls not just controls on capital
inflows, but the more pervasive and intrusive controls that were adopted by
Malaysia to control exchange operations, current transactions and capital
outflows. 21 The highly visible and respected Krugman is now supporting currency
and capital controls that are much more pervasive than many critics of the
neoliberal contagion had previously dared to advocate."'

204. See Ralph Atkins, "Schroder backs plans for currency target zones." FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998,
at 1; Craig R. Whitney, "German Chief Gives France Reassurances About Ties," N.Y. TIMES, Oct 1. 1998, at A17;
David E. Sanger, "Chirac, in U.S., Offers Alternative Approach to Economic Crisis," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999,
A5. See also Michiyo Nakamoto, "Obuchi to Call for New Currency Era," FINANCIAL TIMES. Jan.6, 1999, at 2;
John Grieve Smith, "Managing Exchange Rates," FINANCIALT IMES, Oct.7, 1998, at 10.
205. It is uncertain whether the Bush administration was moving in the direction of more stability in
exchange rates. See "Bush: Overhaul Currency Valuation," NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 1992. at 21.
206. Wolfgang Munchau & Tony Barber, "Bank chiefs reject ency targets," FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 22,
1998, at 1.
207. See note 141 infra and accompanying text.
208. In the summer of 1998 Chile relaxed its capital rstrictions under strong political pressure from foreign
investors. See Craig Torres, "Chilean Stocks Rise as Government Acts," WALL ST. J., June 29, 1998, at A14;
Imogen Mark, "Chile may ease capital inflow rule to lift peso," FINANCIAL TIMEs, June 26,1998, at 8; Greider,
supra note 22, at 319, 490n.
209. See Ricardo French-Davis, Manuel Agosin, Andras Uthoff. "Capital Movements, Export Strategy, and
Macroeconomic Stability in Chile," in COPING WITH CAPITAL SUGP.ES: THE RETURN OF FINANCE TO LATIN
AMERICA 99, 136-37 (French-Davis and S. Griffith-Jones, eds. LRienner 1995); See also Carlos Massad, "'The
Uberalization of the Capital Account: Chile in the 1990's," "in"SH1OULD THE IMF PUSOE CAPITAL- ACCOUNT
CoNTRovERTIBrLITY?, ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, No. 207, (R. Cooper ed., Princeton University 1998);
"Chile's Experience with Capital Controls,"ANNUAL REPORT 1998, 176 (International Monetary Fund, 1998).
210. Krugman, supra note 114, at 78-80; An Open Letter from Paul Krugman to Prime Minister Mahathir,
(Sept. 1, 1998) <http'J/web .mit.edu/krugman/www/mahathir.html.>
211. In light of Krugman's sudden about-face on capital and exchange controls and his late recognition of
the Asian glut and deflation, one might expect him to issue an apology for his earlier criticisms of Greider. See
PAUL KRUGMAN, THE ACCIDENTAL THEORIST 32,74,76 (1998).
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B.

Restrictions on Short-Term CapitalInflows
Throughout much of the past year, there has been a covert discussion taking
place in financial circles about capital controls. Joseph Stiglitz, the chief economist
of The World Bank, has consistently endorsed "speed bumps" to slow down the
pace of global financial speculation, and has expressed sympathy for the Chilean
program." Stiglitz pointed to a study showing no correlation between capital
account liberalization and economic growth, and suggested that mild restraints on
capital flows might help economic growth.21 3 In early February 1998, Stanley
Fischer, the IMF's first deputy managing director, recognized the need to find ways
to deal with the problem of surges of short-term capital across borders. 1 4 Fischer
suggested that the Chilean scheme was one that needed to be considered. 21 More
recently, in September 1998, the IMF's Asia-Pacific Director, Hubert Neiss, stated
that short-term capital controls may be needed to stem the spread of the currency
contagion.2 6 Later that same month, the IMF declared that controls on inward
movements of capital could be a useful tool for some countries, and that opening
economies217prematurely to free flows of capital constituted "an accident waiting to
happen."
Yet, it seems that each time there appears a crack in the official orthodoxy, the
transgressors or their allies at the IMF, Treasury or elsewhere quickly backpedal or
even retract their earlier expressions of misgivings about the dangerous direction
of today's neoliberal policies.2 18 One is tempted to conclude that the prior
confessions were made in unguarded moments, under the weight of conscience,
only to be retracted when one once again imagines the dangers of expressing the
truth and the potential loss of "credibility" in the eyes of the established powers that
profit by today's hot money regime. 9 The accepted orthodoxy, it seems, must be
maintained at all costs, even if that means that an urgently needed debate is delayed,

212. See "Comment and Analysis," FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1998, at 17; Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Using Tax
Policy To Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading," 3 J.FINANCIAL SERvS. RES. 101-15 (1989). See also Paul

Krugman,
"Curfews
on
Capital
Flight:
What
Are
the
Options'
at
<http'/www.web.nit.edukrugman/wwwlcurfews.hml.>.
213. See Joseph Stiglitz, "Road to Recovery," Asiaweek, July 17, 1998 reprinted in
<http'/www.wordbank.orghnl/extdr/extmejsart-aw071798.htmnl.>; James Wilson, "Delegates agree the state
has a role to play in the financial sector-

but what is it?" FINANCIAL TIMES, July 1. 1993, at 6.

214. Louis Uchitelle, "LM.F. May Be Closer To Lending-Curb Idea," N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1998, at C4.
215. Id.

216. Bill Tarrant, "LM.F. Sees Short-Term Capital Controls in Asia." REUTERS, Sept. 14, 1998 (copy on file
with author).
217. Stephen Fidler, "IMP admits drawbacks to capital free flow," FINANCIALTIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at 9.
218. See Michel Camdessus, "Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the Fund," Remarks to IMF
Seminar on Capital Account Liberalization (March 9, 1998); Nancy Dunne, "Summers sees IMF coping with

crisis," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct 23, 1998, at 5. Lawrence Summers, U.S. deputy treasury secretary has become one
of the Clinton administration's chief cheerleaders of capital account liberalization, despite the fact that he supported
taxes on financial transactions prior to his tenure in government. See Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P.
Summers, "When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transactions Tax," 3 J.FIN.
SERVS. REs. 261-81 (1989).
219. For an example of such "strategic positioning," see Enrique R. Carrasco, "Opposition, Justice,
Structuralism, and Particularity: Intersections Between LatCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies" 28 U.

MAMI INTER-AM. L REv. 313, 328-29 (1996-97) (arguing that LatCrits should cautiously support the neoliberal
policies of the IMF and World Bank if those LatCrits want policymakers to take their work seriously).
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and therefore denied, and that badly conceived policies continue to impose suffering
around the world. 2
However, there is a very real and growing split within the world of finance
concerning the pace and degree of financial liberalization, and concerning the use
of temporary controls and prudential restrictions on short-term hot money flows. 2 '
This split is increasingly pushed underground at a time when resurrection of serious
discussion is most needed. This covert debate is being played out around the globe
in the context of the global contagion and increasingly desperate economic and
financial conditions.
In the fall of 1998, Mexican President Zedillo publicly rejected the option of
capital controls. 2' Although that option is taboo in the present political environment, such proposals will probably resurface if the currency contagion continues
to deepen and spread to Mexico. This raises the question of NAFTA's compatibility with controls on capital flows between Mexico and the U.S. NAFTA Article
2104 would permit restrictions on capital transactions if Mexico were experiencing
serious balance of payment problems. But according to Article 2104(5), Mexico
could impose such restrictions "only in conjunction with measures imposed on
current international transactions." The practical effect of this wording is that
Mexico would have to submit to the IMF's surveillance under Article VIII of the
IMF's Articles of Agreement.' That, of course, is only a prescription for continued
economic austerity.
In the alternative, Mexico could invoke NAFTA Article 1410, which permits
reasonable measures for prudential reasons such as the maintenance of safety,
soundness, and integrity of the financial institutions, and the integrity of the
financial system.' Therefore, it seems clear that under NAFTA, Mexico could
legally impose Chilean-style prudential reserve requirements on short-term capital
inflows without swallowing the bitter IMF austerity pill.
In recent years, quite a number of countries have experimented with various
programs of capital restrictions and with varying degrees of success.m In fact,
Chile's encage program was by no means the most restrictive. The Chilean program
has probably received a great deal of enthusiastic attention because of its relatively
modest approach of using the tax system to decrease the financial incentive for
short-term portfolio inflows. Other countries such as China and India have remained
somewhat sheltered from the currency contagion because of their more restrictive

220. See JOHN KENNEn GALBRArI, TH AFFLUENT SoCErY 11 (1958) ("the hallmark of the conventional

wisdom is acceptability").
221. See Michael M. Weinstein, "'wisting Controls on Currency and Capital," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1998,
at Cl; John Plender, "'amingWild Money," FINANCIAL TIMES, OCt. 20, 1998, at 17.
222. Richard Lapper, "Zedillo warns against protectionist pressures," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at
6 (Zedillo claimed that capital controls were doomed to fail). This was not the first time that Yale-educated Zedillo
has rejected controls on speculative capital flows. See Greider,supra note, at 263.
223. NAFTA, supra note 62. Article 2104(5) refers to Article 2104(2Xa) which requires IMF Article VIII
review (and therefore approval) of any currency account exchange restrictions.
224. NAFTA, supra note 62, Article 1410(1).
225. Folkerts-Landau, et a[, supra note 2, at 83 ("changes in reserve requirements in six countries, including
Chile"), 97 ("taxing short-term capital flows, and prudential quantitative limits"), 100-103 ("restrictions on capital
inflows, prudential requirements, and controls on capital outflows").
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programs of exchange controls on capital (both inflows and outflows) and currency
transactions.n 6 Yet, the IMF still ignores the lessons of such successes. 2 7
Also in the fall of 1998, Brazil imposed some restrictions on short-term capital
inflows in response to an increase in capital outflows stemming from the global
currency contagion.22 This was a sharp reversal from Brazil's prior policy. In
November 1997, at the peak of the Asian currency crisis, and in keeping with the
IDF and U.S. agenda for capital account liberalization, Brazil opened loopholes to
attract capital inflows into short-term debt instruments. 2 9 As a result, Brazil's
inflows of hot money soared, leaving the country "vulnerable to investor mood
swings."' The horse was apparently already out of the barn and Brazil was already
too addicted to short-term capital inflows for prudential restrictions on such inflows
to be of much help.231
That is the danger of waiting until the wolf is already at the door.232 The cost of
delay may be the kind of full-blown financial crises that we have seen in Russia and
throughout parts of East Asia. For example, Malaysia adopted exchange restrictions
on capital inflows, capital outflows and current transactions that were much more
pervasive than any of the prudential restrictions that Chile ever imposed.23 And yet
Malaysia seems to be using the breathing space provided by its exchange controls
to boost domestic demand and slowly bring back the foreign investors. 2
Proponents of capital account liberalization fear that Malaysia may succeed in its

226. See Peter Passell, "China's stable currency is protecting it for now," N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at D2
(China seems like an "island of stability" in the Asian financial turmoil because of its exchange controls); Greider,
supra note 22, at 319; Craig S. Smith, "China Can Spur Growth Without a Devaluation," WALL ST. J., June 22,
1998, at Al (controls permit China to limit trading in its currency, the yuan, to a "narrow, tightly controlled
range").
227. Kenneth Kasa, "Could Russia Have Learned from China?" Federal Reserve Bank of San Fransisco
Letter, No. 98-26 (Sept 4, 1998). The IMF shows no recognition that the most important lesson that Russia should
have learned from China's success is to go slower on capital account liberalization. See Zuliu Hu & Mohsin S.
Khan, "Why Is China Growing So Fastl'ECONOMIC ISSUES (International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C., 1997)
at 8.
228. Geogg Dyer, "Brazil to curb short-term capital inflows," FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 30, 1998, at 3.
Francisco Lopes, director for monetary policy of Brazil's central bank, said, "One important lesson of the crisis is
that you take a lot of risks with large short-term capital inflows."
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Geoff Dryer, "Capital Controls for Brazil Rejected," FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan.27 1999, at 3. On the
inevitable fall of the Brazilian currency. See Larry Rohter, "Brazil Devalues Its Currency 8%, Roiling Markets:
Wider Effect Seen," N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 14, 1998, at Al.
232. Japan's recent attempt to protect its curency with increased controls elicited strong political opposition
from the international investment community. See Paul Abrahams & Gillian Tett, "Tokyo to curb short selling to
counter market decline," FINANCIAL TIMES Oct. 2, 1998, at i; Jane Martinson, "Hedge funds unnerved by shortselling rules," FINANCIAL TIMES. Oct. 23, 1998. at 6; Gillian TeML "Anger over Japan's new curbs on short selling."
FINANCIAL TMES, Oct. 23, 1998, at 18; Gillian Tett & Michiyo Nakamoto, "Japan's politicians step on stage with
hedge funds in their sights," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 28. 1998. at 4.
233. "Malaysia Imposes Controls On Trading in Its Currency," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1998, at C2; "Details
on Changes in Exchange Control Mechanism," TIE MALAYSIAN STAR "reprinted" at
<httpJ/www.jaring.my/star/wednesday/cmnotic.html>.
234. Charles Chan, "lrade Surpluses Strong Signs of an Improving Economy." THE MALAYSIAN STAR, Feb.
11, 1999 (copy on file with author); Sheila McNutty, "Malaysia bank chiefs face sack unless they lend," FINANCIAL
TIMES. Nov. 14-15. 1998, at 4; Wong Sulong, "November 1998 Trade Figures Bring More Good News," THE
MALAYSIAN STAR, Jan.6, 1999 (copy on file with author); Edward Luce, "Tokyo Backs Malaysian Bond Issue,"
FINANCIAL TIMES. Dec. 11, 1998, at 8; TJ. Tan, "Malaysia to Borrow from Consortium of Foreign Banks,"
FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec.30, 1998, at4.
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program, at least relative to other Asian countries, and would then present a viable
alternative to the IMF model.235
The situation is even more severe in Russia where the government, on the brink
of default, was forced to call a temporary halt in trading of its currency in the
foreign exchange markets and a moratorium on debt repayments. 6 The Russian
financial meltdown has had a severe impact on its economy, and threatens the
country's political reforms.'" It is particularly tragic that at least some of these dire
consequences could have been avoided had there been greater use of prudential
restrictions on short-term capital inflows.
Such restrictions on hot-money capital flows, however, should be seen as
necessary, but not sufficient to accomplish the objectives of sustainable economic
development. Even if less vulnerable to the dangers of hot-money flight, developing
countries would still be confronted with the challenge of obtaining long-term
assistance to finance their development efforts.? 8 In addition, the leading industrial
countries would still need to end the deflationary biases and tendencies of the global
economy.239
Proposalsfor a FinancialTransaction Turnover Tax
Among the compelling reform proposals that have been raised is the so-called
Tobin Tax, first proposed by the Nobel-laureate economist, James Tobin. It would
impose a turnover tax on foreign exchange transactions, an entry-and-exit toll that
would be a very small percentage of the transaction, but enough to deter overspeculation. 2" As Tobin said, such a tax would "throw sand in the gears of the
speculators."2 4'
C.

235. G.Pierre Goad,"Acceptance of Capital Controls is Spreading," ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept.2, 1998, at I;
David E. Sanger, "Malaysia's Leader Rattles Meeting of Financial Elite," N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1999, Al0; Alan
Cowell, "Annan Fears Backlash Over Global Crisis," N.Y. T"MES, Feb. 1, 1999, A10; David E.Sanger, "Asia's
Economic Tigers Growl at World Monetary Conference: Say Opening of Markets Hands Wall Street too much
Power," N.Y.TIMES, Sept.22, 1997, at Al.
236. See Michael Gordon, "Russians Say Loan By I.M.F. May Fall Short Of The Need," N.Y. TIMES, July
8, 1998, at Al; Celestine Bohlen, "Ruble Rescue Redux," N.Y. lIMES, Aug. 14, 1998, at A6; Celestine Bohlen,
"Russia Warns It Might Default if Western Aid Is Withheld," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at AI0; "Russia:
Currency Controls Tightened," N.Y. TMaS, Jan. 12, 1999, at A6.
237. Timothy L O'Brien, "Horrific Debt, Devastated Economy," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, at A12;
Michael Wines, "Russia's New Leaders Plan to Pay Debt by Printing Money," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at A3;
Grigory Yavlinsky, "Russia's Phony Capitalism," 77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67(1998).
238. Proposals to meet the requirements of long-term development assistance include increasing allocations
of Special Drawing Rights, using revenues from a global financial transactions tax, and low-interest or no interest
recycling ofreserves from surplus to deficit countries. See notes 240-263, 273-275 infra and accompanying text.
239. Proposals to correct the global economy's deflationary biases and tendencies include relaxing the IMF's
severe conditionality requirements, redistributing the burdens of adjustment from deficit to surplus countries, and
reducing reliance on monetary policy to maintain domestic price stability. See notes 200-201. 264-287 infra and
accompanying text.
240. James Tobin, "The New Economics One Decade Older," THE JANEWAY LEcruREs ON HISTORICAL
EcoNoMic(Princeton University Press 1974); THE TOBIN TAX: COPING WITH FINANCIAL VOLATILITY (Mahbub
UI Haq ed., Oxford University Press 1996).
241. See Barry Eichengreen, James Tobin, Charles Wyplosz, "Two Cases for Sand in the Wheels of
International Finance," 105 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 162-72 (1995); But see Paul Davidson, "Are Grains of Sand in
the Wheels of International Finance Sufficient To Do the Job When Boulders Are Often Required?' 107 ECONOMIC
JOURNAL 671-86 (1997). Jacob A. Frenkel, Symposium,"Overview," in CHANGING CAPITAL MARKETS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY PolCY 394 (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 1993).
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Many critics of the Tobin Tax proposal claim that such a tax would be
unenforceable 242 But if the objectives are compelling enough, there is no reason
that such a program should not elicit wide international support and cooperation,
and be effectively implemented, as was the Basle Accord on international capital
standards among the ten leading central banks. 3 Most of the world's foreign
exchange transactions take place in only five countries. 2 In addition, the same
technology that speculators would use to try to evade a Tobin Tax could also be
used to enforce such a tax program. 45
This is another issue on which European leaders are far ahead of U.S. political
leaders. 6 And in March 1999, the Canadian Parliament voted to endorse an
international tax on financial transactions as part of a program to control currency
speculation, making Canada the first G-7 government to formally, though largely
symbolically, endorse such a currency transactions tax.2 7
Many of today's free market cheerleaders have criticized the Tobin Tax and other
prudential restrictions on short-term portfolio capital flows by claiming that such
solutions would prevent countries like Mexico and other emerging markets from
getting the capital that they need for development." 5 However, a Tobin Tax of only
one percent on foreign exchange transactions could raise more than $700 billion
annually, even after counting for reduced trading volume and exemptions to finance
the actual sale of real goods and services.249 Many things could be done with such
sums, including a healthy increase in long-term development assistance to
developing countries.
D. Increasing Global Liquidity with Special Drawing Rights
Back in 1994, before the Mexican peso meltdown and the start of the global
currency contagion, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund,
242. Folkerts-Landau, et al., supra note 2,at 98-99.
243. See Solomon, supra note 146, at414-35; Philip Arestis & Malcolm Sawyer, "How many cheers for the
Tobin transactions tax."21 CAMBRIDGE J.OF Eco. 753-68 (1997).
244. Greider, supra note 22, at 234 (stating, "the City of London remains the world capital of foreignexchange traders, with daily volume of $460 billion, nearly twice Wali Street's"), and 319 ("the most important
foreign-exchange markets are in London, New York, Frankfurt, Tokyo, and Hong Kong").
245. Rodney Schmidt, "A Feasible Foreign Exchange Transactions Tax," (Ottawa: North-South Institute,

1997). All international financial transfers are transacted through Fedwire, CHIPS, or SWIFT, three U.S.-based
clearing systems. See Gerard Wyrsch, "Treasury Regulation of International Wire Transfer," 20 DENVER J. INT'L
L& POL 517-21 (1992). Access to the system could be conditioned upon paying a transaction tax. See Stephen
Zamora, "Remarks,"86 AM.Soc'Y INr'L LPRoc. 201,204 (1992X"If the world community adopts a closed-circuit
system, it will be essential to enter that system in order to take part in the western financial system"). Every
computer message or connection linked to the Internet can be identified and traced through a unique code called
the Internet protocol address. Such computerized coding should be applied to transnational financial transactions.
Edward Wyatt, "Fake Web Posting Leads to Fraud Charge," N.Y. Times, April 16, 1999, Cl (swift tracing of
securities fraud suspect in fake posting on Internet demonstrates how difficult it is to venture into cyberspace
without leaving footprints).
246. Barbara Crossette, "As World Leaders Confer on Poverty, Mitterand Urges New Tax," N.Y. TIMES,
March 12, 1995, at4.
247. "ADP Tobin Tax Wims," RESULTS (Press Release, March 24, 1999); Shawn McCarthy, "Liberals Vote
in Favour of Currency Transaction Tax," GLOBE & MAIL. March 25, 1999, at B5.
248. See "The Case for Global Finance," EcONoMISr, Sept. 12, 1998, at 19, 20 (warning that controls would
encourage capital flight); David R. Henderson, "Let Capital Flow Freely." WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 10, 1998, at A22
(capital controls drastically reduce the incentive for foreign investment).
249. David Felix, The Tobin Tax Proposal: Background, Issues and Prospects 13 (U.N. Development
Programme for the World Summit for Social Development Policy Paper, March 1995).

Spring 1999]

BANKING AND FINANCIAL REFORM

Michel Camdessus proposed increasing "Special Drawing Rights," by $52 billion.2"
The Special Drawing Right (SDR), also known as "paper gold," is a global currency
that was created by the IMF, first issued in 1970, and used as a reserve asset.25'
Supporters of the Camdessus proposal recognized that the formerly communist
and other poor countries had never received any initial allocation of SDRs. 252 It
should be no surprise that many of those countries now lack the reserves with which
to fend off speculative attacks against their currencies. Unfortunately, the
Camdessus proposal was rejected, and Camdessus was reportedly "roundly
criticized by the United States, Germany and Britain, which accused him of empirebuilding.'"253

It may, however, be more accurate to describe the Camdessus proposal as a failed
attempt at empire-breaking, or at least to undermine the dominance of the U.S.
dollar and several other major currencies. There is reason to conclude that the
global monetary system favors First World surplus and creditor countries, as well
as the United States, a chronic deficit country-' that does not operate under the
same constraints as most other deficit countries 55 since its own currency, the U.S.
dollar, is the major reserve currency in the world.
According to a 1991 report by the BIS, capital flows have tended to exaggerate
trade imbalances. 2 The U.S. and other major industrialized countries may
perversely benefit as safe havens for capital fleeing from other countries that are
experiencing extreme and acute financial and economic hardship. In contrast, deficit
countries typically face capital outflows, as capital tries to beat (and thereby
contributes to) a coming devaluation." Attempts by developing countries to defend
the value of their currencies with higher interest rates also contribute to larger trade
and budget deficits," 8 thereby leaving those developing countries more dependent
on hot money inflows.
The Camdessus proposal was not the first time that the IMF had attempted to
increase the allocation of SDR's. Such proposals were supported throughout the
1970's by the IMF's previous managing director, Mr. J. de Larosiere.' 9 Developing
nations also called for increased SDR allocations as part of their demands for a New

250. Paul Lewis, "Rich and Poor Nations Split on Aid Plan," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at DI, D2.
251. SDRs were first established by an amendment to the IMF Articles of Agreement that went into effect
in 1970. Only about $28 billion in SDRs have ever been created. See DETLEv F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 98 (1998).

252. Lewis, supra note 146.
253. Jeff CGeith & Elaine Sciolino, "LM.F. Head: He Speaks, and Money Talks," N.Y. TIMES, April 4,1996,
at Al, A6; Peter Passel, "Ibe Editorial Notebook: New Chips for Bankrupt Countries," March 23, 1984. at A26;
Peter Passell, "Economic Scene: An Old Idea is Dusted Off to Aid Russia: Special Drawing Rights," N.Y.TIMEs,
July 7,1994, at D2.

254. Sylvia Nasar, "Trade Deficit Rises, Setting Record Early," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1999, at Cl.
255. Even huge and growing U.S. trade and current account deficits are not able to undermine the value of
the U.S. dollar, which remains a safe haven during global financial turmoil. See Paul Lewis, "U.S. Said to Face
Brunt of Economic Crisis," N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 9. 1999, at A8.
256. Philip Turner, "Capital Flows in the 1980s: A Survey of Major Trends," BIS Economic Papers, No. 30
(Basle: Bank for International Settlements, April 1991).
257. Id U.S. interest rates may be lower than rates elsewhere because of such inflows of frightened capital:
See DOUG HENWOOD, WALL STREEr 108 (1997).
258. Sachs & Radelet, supra note 119, at A25; Canova & Turgeon, supra note 152.
259.

MARGARET GARRrrSEN DE VIES, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJuSTMENT, 1945 TO 1986: THE IMF

EXPERIENCE 146, 175, 288-89 (1987).
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International Economic Order (NIEO) in the context of the so-called North-South
dialogue. 60
Nevertheless, there has been no increase in the allocation of SDRs for nearly
eighteen years."' Many of the countries that never received an SDR allocation now
find themselves without sufficient reserves to fend off financial speculation. 26
Other developing countries that were given SDR allocations many years ago have
been harmed by the way the global financial system unfairly punishes developing
countries that are experiencing trade and/or budget deficits.
E. Changing the Burdens ofAdjustment: Recycling the Surpluses
When trade between nations remain chronically unbalanced, adjustment must be
made by either deficit and/or surplus nations.' Another approach to the problem
of providing sufficient long-term development capital would attempt to place the
burden of adjustment on surplus countries by requiring them to recycle their
reserves at low or no interest to deficit countries.
In the months leading up to the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, Keynes offered
a proposal for an International Clearing Union which would have assessed an
interest charge on excess reserves above a country's quota.26' This, he believed,
would remedy the defects in the pre-war adjustment mechanism that put an unequal
burden of adjustment on deficit countries, thereby creating a contractionary pressure
on world conunerce. 2 6 Keynes claimed that the International Clearing Union plan
would pressure adjustment on "any country whose balance of payments with the
rest of the world is departing from equilibrium in either direction." 267
Keynes's proposal was rejected at the Bretton Woods Conference, in favor of the
American plan for the International Monetary Fund, which lacked an explicit
mechanism for assessing charges against chronic surplus countries.2' While the

260. NORTH-SOUTH: A PROGRAMME FOR SURvIvAL (Report of the Independent Commission on
International Development Issues, MIT Press, 1980), at 211-212 (also known as the Brandt Commission); ROBERT
L RoTHSYEN, GLOBAL BARGAINING 162 (1979); John Williamson, "'The SDR Link," in THE NEW INTERNATONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOuTH DEBATE 81-104 (Jagdish N. Bhagwati, ed., MIT Press 1977).
261. "Special
Drawing
Rights,"
Survey
Supplement
on
the
Fund
1996,
at
<http://www.imf.org/externalpubs/ft/survey/supO996/l0sdr.html.> (last allocation was Jan. 1, 1981 when only
SDR 4.1 billion was allocated).
262. In a particularly short-sighted stance, the U.S. Treasury Department opposes offering Russia any new
IMF resources. David E. Sanger, "LM.F. Relents on Aid to Russia, but U.S. Talks Tougher," N.Y. TIMEs, March
30, 1999, at A6.
263. While each member country was originally allocated SDRs in proportion to its IMP quota (i.e.,
contribution), the IMF has discretionary power to expand the size of SDR allocations. Vagts, supra note 251, at
98; Lewis, supra note 146; Francis Stewart, "Back to Keynesianism: Reforming the IMF," IV WORLD POLICY J.
3 (1987), 465, 477.
264. Geoffrey Gilbert, "International Clearing Union," chapter in AN ENYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS 256, 257 (Thomas Cate, ed., Edward Elgar Pub.1997).
265. Id. at 257; James Crotty, "On Keynes and Capital Flight," 21 J.ECON. LITERATURE 59 (1983).
266. Robert Skidelsky, "Keynes's New Order. The Genesis of the Clearing Union," paper presented at PostKeynesian Workshop Conference, June 26-July 1, 1998 (draft on file with author).
267. Gilbert, supra note 264, at 258.
268. Id. (stating that it was not surprising that the American plan prevailed or that it favored surplus
countries, given the fact that die U.S. was a surplus country at the time, and enjoyed a "commanding political and
economic position").
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Articles do contain a "scarce currency clause" to shift some burden of adjustment
on surplus countries, that provision has been largely ignored by the IMF.269
Throughout its existence, the IMF has consistently demonstrated a bias that
places the complete burden of adjustment on deficit countries. 270 When a country's
balance of payments is chronically in deficit and its reserves are declining, IMF
consultations result in a classic austerity program under which the deficit country
deflates its economy by raising interest rates, constraining the growth of the money
supply, cutting back on government spending, and raising taxes. As the deficit
country falls into recession, its citizens simply lose the means to continue to
demand imports from the rest of the world. If the burdens of adjustment were
distributed in a more equitable manner, then chronic surplus countries would be
compelled to inflate their economies, import more goods and services from the
deficit world, and/or recycle their surplus through long-term foreign investment and
grants. Not surprisingly, developing countries also urged a more equitable
distribution of the burdens of adjustment as part of their calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in the 1970's."7

Japan is the classic example of a surplus country that had not recycled its surplus.
Japan has out-traded the rest of the world, but it is sitting on a mountain of foreign
reserves, and it is now choking on those surpluses.'T In contrast, after World War
II, the United States created the European Recovery Program, also known as the
Marshall Plan, in which the U.S. government gave $13 billion (more than $150
billion in today's dollars) in foreign aid in just a four year period, from 1947 to
1951, to Western Europe to rebuild their economies. 273
The Marshall Plan stimulus was highly successful; by 1951, the Marshall Plan
countries had raised their industrial output by 40 percent.274 We often forget how
much West European and U.S. prosperity owes to public-sector investment in longterm infrastructure and technologies, 275 rather than short-term private hot-money
flows. Moreover, post-war reconstruction of Western Europe occurred behind the
protection of capital and currency controls. 276 Most of Western Europe did not

269. See notes 288-291 infra and accompanying text.
270. NoRTH-SourH. supra note 260, at 213-14.
271. Id. (IMF or others should devise means to encourage countries in current account surpluses to make
"long-term loans to deficit countries that am undertaking needed adjustment").
272. Paul Abrahams, "Japanese Trade Surplus Climbs To Record $1221n," FINANCIAL TIME. Jan. 26, 1999.
16; Wayne Angell, "How To Save Japan From Oversaving," WALL ST. J., June 22, 1998, A2. For an early
recognition and explanation of Japan's economic weakness, see LYNN TURGEON, STATE AND DISCRIMINATION:
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COLD WAR 98 (1989).
273. LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUION OF ECONOMIC THINKING AND
POLCYMAKINO SIN(E WORLD WAR 1 7,10,59 (1996); J.M. JONES, THE FIfrEEN WEEKS (1955); Paul Davidson,

"Reforming the world's money," 15 J. OF POST-KEYNESIAN ECO. 153. 156 (1992-93); Dimand, supra note 164,
at 53 (on comparable US aid to Japan and the Anglo-American Financial Agreement, in which the US extended
a $3.75 billion line of credit to Britain).
274. John Blunt, et. al., THE NATIONAL ExPERIENCE 720 (1977).

275. U.S. post-war prosperity depended in significant pan on military expenditures. In early 1950, President
Truman signed a secret National Security Council memorandum NSC-68, drafted by Leon Keyseling, the chair of
the Council of Economic Advisers, who was also instrumental in drafting the Employment Act of 1946. During
the Kennedy administration, economic growth was once again spurred by military spending, space expenditures,
and foreign aid. Turgeon, supra note 273, at 9-10, 13.17.
276. FRED L BLOCK, THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DISORDER 109 (1977) (at the beginning
of the 1950s "no major European currency was convertible"). See Garritsen de Vries, supra note 259, at 30-32.
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achieve currency convertibility until the end of 1958;"2 capital controls were not
lifted until later. In fact, some larger Western European countries did not fully
remove capital controls until the 1990's, obviously well after achieving significant
economic development.27 Yet, today the IMF expects developing countries to reach
economic take-off without restricting hot money capital flows.
In omitting the history and success of the Marshall Plan, today's dominant
narratives about development serve to misinform public discussion about global
capital markets. For instance, in editorializing that capital controls would scare off
foreign capital, the Economist offered a photo of a construction site above the
caption: "The benefit of foreign capital," 9 by which the Economist meant "private"
foreign capital. This view conveniently ignores the fact that much of Western
Europe's post-war construction sites were the result of the Marshall Plan, a publicsector transfer of capital during a time of widespread currency and capital controls.
More revealing is how this view reflects the ethics of a hard core drug dealer.
The euphoria of the short-term inflow somehow justifies the addictiona ° no matter
how ephemeral and illusory the prosperity appears after the crash, no matter the
inevitable outcome of lost jobs and broken dreams. But the free market pushers of
hot money flows do not expect to be the ones waking up with hangovers after the
party is over. They will not even imagine such a fate. And their calls for more
austerity for deficit countries that have fallen victim to the hot money addiction
show that they refuse to accept any degree of responsibility for the results of their
actions.2 8'
Finally, it is instructive to once again compare the U.S. recycling of its surplus
through the Marshall Plan with what Japan has done with its surplus." 2 By
recycling its post-war surplus, the U.S. essentially accepted its share of the burden
of adjustment. Western Europe used those Marshall Plan funds to purchase
American products and to pay American construction companies, and in that way
the Marshall Plan helped to sustain demand in the American economy as well." 3
Japan, on the other hand, has sat on its vast surplus of reserves, and instead of
recycling through massive foreign aid,2 ' Japan has sunk those funds into
speculation in stock and real estate markets, and created financial bubbles that

277. Id.
278. Mussa & Goldstein, supra note 96, at 252.
279. "Time to turn off the tap?' ECONOMIS, Sept. 12, 1998, at 83, 85.
280. Stanley Fischer, "Capital Account liberalization and the Role of the IMF," 3-5 (International Monetary
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resolution of external debt problems due to a major capital outflow was not the responsibility of the Fund, but was
the responsibility of the country facing this outflow. In an age of liberalization of capital markets, these principles
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282. See note 272 infra and accompanying text.
283. Turgeon, supra note 273, at 7, 10, 59.
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inevitably burst."' 5 The result has been a dangerous price deflation and recession in
the world's second largest economy.'s The major industrial countries, including the
U.S., have also refused to recycle the reserves to ease Russia's transition from
communism to market capitalism. It is not suprising that, in the aftermath of the
Russian ruble collapse, many Russians now feel betrayed by the West.287
F.

The Scarce Currency Clause and Other Trade Tactics

Finally, pressure could also be brought to bear on surplus countries to recycle
their surpluses through the IMF Articles of Agreement. Article VII is the so-called
"scarce currency clause" which permits the IMF to identify a chronic surplus
country, declare its currency to be a scarce currency, and permit the rest of the
world to discriminate against that country's imports.288 Unfortunately, the scarce
currency clause has never been invoked, 9 and consequently the IMF's approach
to adjustment has been "highly asymmetrical" by placing the major burden of policy
change and adjustment on deficit countries.2 But a credible threat to effectively
use the scarce currency clause might pressure a surplus country to recycle its
reserves to deficit countries. 29'

Even international trade law supports the use of trade restrictions to maintain a
balance of payments equilibrium if the restrictions comply with principles of
nonselectivity and nondiscrimination. Article 12 of GATT, which has been adopted
by the WTO, permits the use of import controls if the achievement and maintenance
of full employment generates a high level of demand for imports that threaten a
country's monetary reserves. 2 In order to safeguard its external financial position
and achieve full employment, a contracting party "may restrict the quantity or value

285. David P. Hamilton, "So, How Far Has Japan Fallen? Take A Look at These Numbers," WALL ST. J.,
July 2, 1998. at Al9.
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Gillian Tett & Edward Luce, A Man and machine mystified by negative interest rates," FINANCIAL TIMEs, Nov.
10. 1998. 6; Gillian Tett, "Bank of Japan steps in to buy more corporate debt," FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 30, 1998,
at 22.
287. Michael Wines, "Hostility to U.S. is Now Popular with Russians," N.Y.TIMES, April 12, 1999, at Al,
A 1l; See also notes 236-237.
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on the freedom of exchange operations in the scarce currency). Block, supra note 274, at 52.
289. The IMFs General Counsel does not even mention the scarce cunency clause as an exception to the
Articles' prohibition against restrictions on current transactions. Gianviti, supra note 156, at 775-76.
290. Stewart, supra note 243, at 472. According to Sir Roy Harrod, Article VII Section 3(b) may violate
the multilateral principle at the base of the IMF, thereby making the operation of the scarce currency clause "a
purely bilateral matter between each separate member and the scarce currency country." Roy F. Harrod, THE
DOLLAR 110 (New York. Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1954).
291. During the 1970's, the IMF's managing director, Mr. De Larosiere urged surplus countries to increase
their official development financing to help deficit countries develop infrastructure, their resource base, and sustain
their living standards. Garritsen de Vries, supra note 259, at 174, 228.
292. Wynne Godley, "A Critical Imbalance in U.S. Trade: The U.S. Balance of Payments, International
Indebtedness, and Economic Policy," Public Policy Brief no. 23, at 25 (Jerome Levy Economics Institute,
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of merchandise permitted to be imported." 9 a If properly interpreted and applied,
international trade law could be used to encourage chronic surplus countries to bear
more of the burdens of adjustment.2
VII. FINDING OPPORTUNITY IN STABILITY
The full implications of the range of these proposed reforms are compelling. First
and foremost, countries would be free to pursue and maintain economic growth and
full employment without excessive fear of currency contagion and economic
collapse. Most elected governments are presently caught between a rock and a hard
place; they try to respond to the needs of their citizens, but also attempt to placate
the demands of industrialized countries, multilateral institutions, and private
financial markets.
A reformed and truly progressive global financial architecture that permits full
employment would be a return to the original purposes of the Bretton Woods
agreement. 2" It would begin to reverse the destructive trends towards high real
interest rates, widespread underemployment, slow or declining economic growth,
high poverty levels, and stagnant incomes that have beset submerging market
countries in recent months and years. 2 These reforms would permit central banks
to deliver much lower interest rates and elected governments to use fiscal policy for
a broad range of economic and social purposes, without fear that capital would flee
a country's currency. While such lower real interest rates would not be cherished
by owners of financial capital, they would certainly prove very beneficial for the
health of industrial capital and social enterprise.
A more stable regime would present different opportunities for social progress
and private profit. There might not be the shotgun marriage of U.S. investment and
Mexican banking, but there could be greater opportunities for prosperity and profit
in the trade of real goods and services, and increased commerce and tourism
between these neighbors.297 Hopefully some of these broader questions will be
introduced in discussions by considering the mechanisms by which today's financial
regime has actually impeded progress in Mexico, the United States and around the
globe, and by considering the challenges that confront our efforts to reform today's
speculative regime into a more stable system of relations.
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